Jeanne M. Haskin studied international relations at Central Connecticut State University of New Britain and political science and international diplomacy at Yale University, with a focus on conflict and crisis management in warring situations. She has published three books with Algora.

Could we, should we, have prevented the break up of Yugoslavia? Can genocide be prevented, or halted? The author examines the dire consequences of the rapid economic reforms demanded by the West and asks where responsibility lies when...

Could we, should we, have prevented the break up of Yugoslavia? Can genocide be prevented, or halted? The author examines the dire consequences of the rapid economic reforms demanded by the West and asks where responsibility lies when external pressures destroy a nation and lead to genocide. Bosnia and Beyond: The "Quiet" Revolution that wouldn't go quietly is, in part, the story of how the West destroyed a country through the imposition of economic and political reform. Promoted as a way to modernize Yugoslavia and bring it into the mainstream, the program was in fact meant to bring down the Communist government in a "quiet revolution" of the type that was envisaged for other former Soviet bloc countries. Showing how Western plans for the liberalization of the country resulted in ethnic polarization and the election of ethno-nationalist leaders, the book then goes on to describe the events of the war. The struggle of the republics for independence was yet another proxy war, which the West encouraged in order to chastise Milosevic and nudge him into becoming the man that they wanted him to be. While no formal plan has surfaced to show that the whole thing was engineered to provide a base for US/NATO troops, on the other hand, the situation was so egregious that intervention was highly sought and that the West had an obligation to clean up its mess, which it finally did. Many have been emotionally manipulated into being grateful for NATO intervention, and then it was quite convenient that a NATO base existed. But how does one say that intervention was needful, and then point the finger at the intervening forces? One can claim that Germany, Austria and the Vatican were in favor of Croatian and Slovenian secession and the US came late to the game to demand Bosnian independence. It can also be claimed that Britain and France did not stand in the way of Serbian secession within Bosnia and Croatia but rather promoted their goals. Yugoslavia was a case of secession within secession, raising the question of who was supported by whom in either case. The work considers the research and views of a wide range of scholars, historians, journalists, and humanitarian writers such as Cohen and Reisman; Udoviki and Ridgeway Eds.; Norman Cigar; Laura Silber and Alan Little; Danielle Sremac; Michael Walzer; Ed Vulliamy; Peter Maas; Samantha Power; Peter du Preez; Lawrence Freedman; Hoffman, Johansen and Sterba; Ervin Staub; and Thomas Mockaitis.

The break-up of Yugoslavia was a terrible tragedy in which the West was deeply involved. Its generosity during the Cold War toward non-aligned countries that were of strategic value to the West abruptly came to an end once the Soviet Union crumbled. Thus, Yugoslavia was suddenly informed that it must face significant financial restructuring in order to pay back the loans that it had received from the West while the Cold War was raging. From prosperity to ruin While no one questions that borrowed money must eventually be repaid, it was the terms of financial restructuring that devastated Yugoslavia. The harshness of economic reform resulted in 17 percent unemployment by the end of the 1980s, while those who were employed were subjected to wage cuts and freezes. The situation was so terrible that it forced people to rely on family, kin, and their extended ethnic communities in order to survive. Nor was there an end in sight. Instead, Yugoslavia was directed to enact further reforms that would result in more decline. In the United States, a series of Ã??'Secret SensitiveÃ??'� Directives of the National Security Agency dated 1982 and 1984 indicate that the purpose of economic reform was to bring down YugoslaviaÃ??'s Communist government. They advocated a Ã??'quiet revolutionÃ??'� of the type that was envisaged for the former Soviet bloc countries. Political liberalization coupled with economic reform was supposed to bring about regime change. And this did happen. Elections were held in the different republics in the year 1990, and ethno-nationalist leaders were swept to victory. What the elections did not produce was a series of moderate leaders who could allay the fears of the people and hold the country together. But this was largely due to the economic and political climate that the West had contrived to achieve, a possibility matrix in which people made various decisions. The situation when most of these leaders came to power was one of serious unrest, such that they had either to put down strikes and organized mass protests or try to co-opt the people in the name of other causes....

IntroductionPart I. Breaking Up Yugoslavia1. The pre-war situation2. Propaganda versus truth3. Milosevic and Izetbegovic4. War in Croatia5. The prelude to war in Bosnia6. War in Bosnia-Herzegovina7. A

IntroductionPart I. Breaking Up Yugoslavia1. The pre-war situation2. Propaganda versus truth3. Milosevic and Izetbegovic4. War in Croatia5. The prelude to war in Bosnia6. War in Bosnia-Herzegovina7. Aid, safe havens, and betrayal8. The Markale Massacre and the slaughter at SrebrenicaPart II. Lessons from Yugoslavia's Tragedy1. Recognizing genocide2. Fighting genocide3. Collective security4. When and how to intervene5. Partition and peace agreements6. Humanitarian aid7. War crimes8. Peacekeeping reform9. The Psychology of genocideBibliographyIndex