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Contrary to what is often reported in history books, the Morgenthau Plan had a major impact on postwar planning. This book traces the role of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury to President Roosevelt, in the planning for the postwar world, with close attention to the discussions leading up to the Second Quebec Conference where Winston Churchill's acceptance of the plan was obtained. It follows the devastating consequences of the policies based on the plan, and their contribution to the postwar collapse of the European economy. Damning evidence shows that the Allies intentionally brought starvation and disease to large civilian populations.

There is a curious lack of critical interest in the period of history immediately following the Second World War. Inconsistencies and obvious falsehoods are accepted at face value by respected historians. This reexamination reaches some disturbing conclusions. It is an account of a twentieth century holocaust. As a result of the Morgenthau Plan, which preceded the Marshall Plan, millions of people perished without mention.

Reading this account can only lead the open-minded reader to the conclusion that the historical record has been grossly distorted. As James Bacque commented, "It is astonishing to encounter such a wholesale erasure of history."

The conventional account contains four misleading assertions. The Morgenthau Plan was not designed to “cripple” German industrial potential or to transform Germany into a “pastoral” state, as is often reported. This plan was designed to completely destroy the German economy, enslave millions of her citizens, and exterminate as many as 20 million people. Dr. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., a senior historian with the United States Army Center for Military History has stated,

The plans made at the highest levels of the U.S. and British governments in 1944 expressed a determination to destroy Germany as a world power once and for all by reducing her to a peasant economy, although this would mean the starvation of millions of civilians.

McGeorge Bundy provides a typical explanation of the plan's rejection:

This preposterous paper died young; Roosevelt shared it with Hull, Hull with others, and someone with the newspapers. In the resulting hullabaloo Roosevelt began to assert that he had no such plan, and when Stimson responded by reading back to him what he had initialed, he was "frankly . . . staggered and said he had no idea how he could have initialed this.”

[However,] Churchill stated, "We intend to take steps far more drastic and effective than those that followed the last war, because we know much more about this business, so as to render all offensive action by Germany utterly impossible for generations to come.”

Secondly, the Morgenthau Plan thoroughly reflected President Roosevelt’s views on postwar policy. He had spent a great deal of time studying and promoting the plan, often against heated opposition. There is also reason to believe that he made significant concessions to obtain British acceptance of the plan. However, few commentators accept Warren Kimball’s conclusion that, “What appears to have been on the surface to have been the impulsive acceptance by Churchill and Roosevelt of the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization and reform of Germany was actually the culmination of an intensive and wide-ranging debate within the American government.” ...