Above all, Lee Carpenter has been one of America's most important back-room Defense workers. Politically "centrist" and working as a civilian, his assessments came to be respected and relied upon by top US military leaders and arms control negotiators all the way up to Amb. Max Kampelman, whom he was invited to serve in the final years of his career as a weapon system and force structure analyst.

After serving in the US Marine Corps and working as a General Electric technician for the US Navy,  Carpenter developed a four-decades-long career with the Bell Telephone Companies, IBM, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Department of State, dedicated to enhancing the strategic defense posture of the United States. 

His 1980 Soviet threat analysis guided and facilitated the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Forces Renewal Program. His work with the Administration during 1980–1983 and testimony to the 97th and 98th Congress ensured agreements to produce 100 B-1 bombers, to base 100 MX ICBMs in the Minuteman ICBM silos, to develop and produce the Trident D-5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, and to develop a small land-mobile ICBM.

Carpenter also spent four years working in Geneva, Switzerland, as a Senior Advisor to the US–Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks. During this period he also prepared analyses of Soviet initiatives and anticipated the systemic failure of the Soviet Union.

A defense analyst who served on the frontlines of the struggle for military parity, the author was intensely engaged in the efforts of the US technical, military, and diplomatic communities to assess, counter, and of course to seek to outperform...

A defense analyst who served on the frontlines of the struggle for military parity, the author was intensely engaged in the efforts of the US technical, military, and diplomatic communities to assess, counter, and of course to seek to outperform the Soviet Union from 1952 to 1989. His studies, tested by many and refuted by none, show that the Soviets had established overwhelming strategic military superiority in the 1970s and 1980s. His analyses of planned US weapons systems vis-a-vis the Soviets' strong suit ran counter to accepted wisdom among many high-ranking military officers, Washington insiders, and major technology firms who had lucrative contracts at stake -- including his employers. Carpenter was fired by Bell and variously threatened by IBM, and the KGB had a photo-file on him -- they understood his conclusions were accurate. Just prior to retirement, the author also provided exclusive analyses to Ambassador Max Kampelman, contributing to successful arms negotiations that provided stability and led to essential strategic parity for the next twenty-odd years. (By the way, could it be that it was the attainment of a position of military superiority that allowed the Soviet Union room to reformulate itself in the late 1980s and 1990s, renegotiating its relationships with the republics of the "near abroad" on commercial terms rather than as dependencies?)

This is the story of a nearly 40-year battle to get America the best strategic defense systems money could buy -- while eliminating costly boondoggles. As a voluntary defense consultant, I advised the US Air Force, the Defense Department, President ReaganÃ??'s transition team, subcommittees of the Senate Arms Services and to the House of Representatives Interior and Armed Services Committees, and President ReaganÃ??'s Commission on Strategic Forces. For the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and then the State Department I served as the Senior Advisor at the USÃ??'Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, Switzerland, during 1985Ã??'1988. My most valuable contributions to national defense were made as a private individual, without remuneration and at considerable professional and some personal risk. Due in part to my efforts several misguided military endeavors were cancelled, saving the country $10 billion or more in ill-considered defense expenditures but causing dismay among companies counting on juicy military contracts and senior officials who had staked their reputations on projects that were proven to be ill-considered. More realistic, worthwhile programs were implemented. The B-70 Strategic Bomber Program and the Multiple Protective Shelter and Densepack basing schemes for the MX (later Peacekeeper) ICBM stand out as misguided developments whose demise was beneficial to our country. saving the country $10 billion or more in ill-considered defense expenditures. At the same time I was a determined advocate of efforts that resulted in the development and production of more than l000 short-range attack missiles (SRAM) for the B-52, FB-111 and B-1 strategic bombers. I redefined the unique and necessary strategic bomber mission, and the avionics bombing systems for the B-52 and B-1 were designed for the new mission. Twenty-one years of advocacy finally brought the B-1 Bomber to successful development, production and deployment in the mid-l980s. The unique and comprehensive strategic force structure analysis I prepared in the mid-l970s identified the nature and timing of the overwhelming Soviet strategic threat to the United States: Air Force Study of US-USSR Strategic Forces (1975-1985). The study, and Washington briefings based on its findings, justified B-1 Bomber production and accelerated the MX ICBM development in l976 under the Ford Administration. The l980 Soviet threat analysis, Evolution and Capabilities of US and USSR Strategic Forces (l975-2000), facilitated the Reagan AdministrationÃ??'s Strategic Forces Renewal Program. My work with the Administration during l980Ã??'l983 and testimony to the 97th and 98th Congress ensured agreements to produce 100 B-1 bombers, to base 100 MX ICBMs in the Minuteman ICBM silos, to develop and produce the Trident D-5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, and to develop a small land-mobile ICBM. Then for four years I worked in Geneva, Switzerland, as the Senior Advisor to the Nuclear and Space Talks. During this period I prepared analyses of Soviet initiatives and a study that anticipated the systemic "failure of the Soviet Union. Most of my studies were classified as secret; but the passage of two or three decades allows sharing this behind-the-scenes view of work that may be of value to those interested in knowing more about the evolving balance of strategic military power, and the technical, political, and diplomatic hurdles involved. Thus the following chronicle.