“It has become generally accepted in foreign policy circles that the US and China are competing in a ‘superpower marathon’ that could last a century. However, the most acute part of the competition will last no more than a decade,” says the magazine Foreign Affairs, published by the Council on Foreign Relations. “… The moment of maximum danger will come in a few years.” [. . .]
“If China swallows Taiwan,” writes Foreign Affairs, “it will gain access to world-class technology and acquire an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ projecting military power to the western Pacific, plus the ability to blockade Japan and the Philippines… Taiwan is the axis of power in east Asia: controlled by Taipei, the island is a fortress against Chinese aggression”. [. . .]
“U.S. strategic alliances, meanwhile, might still exist on paper, but most would be dead letters. Washington might retain only two sets of regular partners. The first would include Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. These countries are strategically arrayed across the globe, and their militaries and intelligence agencies are already integrated with Washington’s. All but Japan boast growing working-age populations, unlike most other U.S. allies, and thus have the potential tax bases to contribute to U.S. missions. The second group would consist of places such as the Baltic states, the Gulf Arab monarchies, and Taiwan, which share borders with or sit in close proximity to U.S. adversaries. The United States would continue to arm these partners but would no longer plan to defend them. Instead, Washington would essentially use them as buffers to check Chinese, Iranian, and Russian expansion without direct U.S. intervention.
Outside of those partnerships, all of Washington’s alliances and relationships—including NATO and its connections with longtime allies such as South Korea—would be negotiable. The United States would no longer woo countries to participate in multilateral alliances. Instead, other countries would have to bargain on a bilateral basis for U.S. protection and market access. Countries with little to offer would have to find new partners or fend for themselves.” [. . .]
