By John Helmer, Moscow via Helmer
Excerpt
In a single line expressed through a reporter, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov explained the defeat in Syria as a tactical withdrawal in preparation for a “military conflict with NATO in the next 10 years.” He emphasized that Russia currently needs solutions to ensure at least a long-term balance in the global confrontation. This statement appeared in the Kremlin-funded security analysis platform Vzglyad on January 3, with no mention of Syria. To highlight its significance, Vzglyad added an editorial note in italics: “In a prolonged confrontation with the West, it is essential to skillfully combine economic and military strategies. Judging by the initial results of economist Belousov’s activities as Minister of Defense, this is precisely what we observe.”
A political source in Moscow concurs: “Russia has to confront all of NATO head-on within the next ten years. If a deal can be made now to buy some time for rearmament, that’s a strategic choice that will have to be made.”
However, not all military sources in Moscow agree. Some believe that during discussions in October and November, when President Vladimir Putin listened to arguments from the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry against the Turkish plan to break out of Idlib and capture Damascus, the Kremlin underestimated the message that Russia’s acquiescence would send to the US and NATO allies. “Anyone now thinking Russia can be counted on as an ally,” comments one source, “is mistaken.”
These sources believe that the pressure on Putin to make fresh concessions in Ukraine will intensify. “The US and NATO used the time we conceded in Minsk to prepare for a war we weren’t as prepared to fight as they were in February 2022. Delay was our mistake. They want time now to rearm the Kiev regime for the next round. Our aim should be capitulation in Kiev and no future for the enemy. For us, that’s the strategy.”
In support of the Kremlin’s refusal to defend Syria and the government of Bashar al-Assad, the Kremlin’s supporters among Anglo-American podcasters have become experts on Arab, Syrian, and Iranian politics; one of them has even relocated to Beirut.
An independent timeline of events produced by French analyst Thierry Meyssan omits analysis of Russian actions but confirms that President Assad flew to Moscow on November 29. This was a secret kept by the Kremlin and the Russian press. “On November 30, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad went to Russia—not to attend his son Hafez’s exam at Moscow University, where he is continuing his studies, but to call for help. The Russian forces in Syria could only bomb the jihadists’ convoys because their capabilities were limited to aerial operations. Therefore, they tried to block the roads to HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham] and Turkey but could not intervene on the ground against them. Aleppo was truly lost.”
An eyewitness, Kamel Saqr, provided a detailed account of what happened, in what sequence, and with what implications. Saqr is exceptional because he was present as a senior member of Assad’s staff at the secret meeting between Assad and Putin in Moscow on November 29. He listened to Putin’s telephone call with General Valery Gerasimov during the meeting and continued negotiating with Putin’s subordinates through the evening of November 29 and the morning of November 30, before Assad and his staff left Moscow at 4 p.m. that day.
Nothing comparable to this account has appeared in public from any other credible source. Saqr’s interpretation of what he calls “the state of disavowal” is disputable; the facts, however, are less so. Saqr states that Assad directly told him that when he was at his Moscow residence in the Four Seasons Hotel, Putin had sent him a message to keep the visit a secret, canceling Saqr’s negotiations with the Kremlin press office on a joint communiqué for public release.
Furthermore, according to Saqr, Putin’s message to Assad was that “the [Russian] military was not in a position to wage war, either psychologically or logistically.” In retrospect, Saqr interprets Putin as having decided, before the fall of Aleppo to the Turkish-led forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on December 2, not to prevent their southward advance toward Damascus and to reject accepting Iranian reinforcements through the Khmeimim airbase. From Saqr’s record of the last meetings in Damascus between Assad and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi on December 5-6, he admits he does not know how coordinated the Russian and Iranian decision-making had been, or for how long. During that week, Saqr reports that Assad tried to contact Putin on December 3, 4, and 5, and on each occasion, Putin reportedly refused to answer. Assad then reached out to the French, asking them to inform Putin that he was trying to make contact. The French replied after several hours, stating that Putin was visiting Belarus “and therefore cannot talk to you.”
This was false. The Kremlin record shows that Putin was in Moscow on all three days.
On the evening of December 3, after Saqr claims Assad’s call had been rejected, Putin spoke by telephone with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had initiated the call. In their discussion, according to the Kremlin release, Putin asked Erdogan to “stop the radical groups’ terrorist aggression against the Syrian state and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate authorities’ efforts to restore stability and constitutional order across the country, including using Ankara’s capabilities in the region.” Erdogan reportedly agreed on “strengthening cooperation both bilaterally and within the framework of the Astana process, emphasizing the key importance of further close coordination between Russia, Turkey, and Iran to normalize the situation in Syria.”
Erdogan’s claims were misleading. According to Saqr’s account of what Assad had been told by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed al-Sudani, Erdogan had declared that the time for mediation was over.
Putin remained in Moscow to meet with the Security Council on December 5, without any acknowledgment in the communiqué that the situation in Syria was discussed. Putin then flew to Minsk on the afternoon of December 6 and continued meetings there the following day. The Kremlin record of his movements and meetings is then silent until December 9 when Putin returned to Moscow. So did Assad.
Saqr adds that the Russian military attaché in Damascus, Rear Admiral Oleg Kornienko, met with Assad at his residence “in the last hours of his rule,” on December 7-8. They appear to have discussed arrangements for Assad’s evacuation from Khmeimim and the terms of his asylum in Russia. Saqr’s publication is politically significant because his interpretation of Russian actions, particularly Putin’s decision-making, was broadcast on January 7 by the Saudi Arabian state-owned media platform, Al Arabiya.
Syria’s former media chief and top aide to Bashar al-Assad claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have “tricked” the ousted Syrian president in his final days as leader. Speaking to Mazeej Studios, a podcast produced by the Saudi channel Al Arabiya, Kamel Saqr stated that Assad was in Moscow in late November, just over a week before Syrian rebels captured Damascus. By that time, the rebels had already captured much of Aleppo.
There, Saqr said, Assad asked for Putin’s support in helping Iran transport equipment and support to strengthen his government’s positions against the opposition. “Bashar al-Assad’s request to Putin was for him to personally handle securing the aerial transportation necessary to deliver military aid to support or stop the advance of the Syrian opposition,” Saqr stated. This request came as Iran reduced its forces and militias’ presence in Syria, and Hezbollah suffered heavy losses in its battles against Israel in Lebanon. Saqr believes neither Russia nor Iran wanted to intervene heavily in this battle, but Assad informed him that Putin had instructed his chief of staff [General Valery Gerasimov] to prepare to support any transport needed for Iran at Russia’s Khmeimim base in Latakia.
“But what happened was that the Iranians told Bashar al-Assad, ‘We did not receive any signals to proceed with moving Iranian aircraft to the Khmeimim base [or to] fly through Iraqi airspace to land there,’” Saqr told Mazeej. “The question was relayed to Moscow, but no answer came.” When asked whether this was a “trick by Putin,” Saqr remarked that there was “no other explanation.”
Regardless, Saqr said the Iranians informed Assad that they had sent a plane through Iraq but were warned by the US that the aircraft would be shot down if it continued. Saqr claims Putin did not answer any of Assad’s calls between December 3-5, before his fall, and that despite having planned a 400-word speech addressing the situation, the former Syrian president ultimately decided against speaking to the public.
As rebel forces neared Damascus, Assad spoke to his media office for the last time on December 7, discussing a military meeting at the Khmeimim base between him and the Russians. Saqr believes Assad left “from Damascus airport via a private plane, taking the southern bypass road and then the airport road to reach the airport.”
Saqr added, “My information suggests that he stayed at the base for several hours until the plane was secured, prepared, and its takeoff and flight to Moscow were ensured.”
What were the Iranians thinking and doing in parallel? An audio recording, purportedly of a speech given by Brigadier General Behrouz Esbati of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at a Tehran mosque on December 31, surfaced in Iranian media a week later. Excerpts of the speech, though not a full authenticated recording or transcript, have been highlighted in interpretations by the New York Times and the Israeli press, alongside anti-Russian commentaries from Kiev to Washington.
In the brief excerpt reported by Abdi Media, Esbati criticized Russian policy in Syria: “Russia was one of the factors that led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Russia turned off all radar systems so that Israel could strike the intelligence headquarters of Shahid Sadiq. The Russians were bombing the deserts instead of targeting the headquarters of Tahrir al-Sham [HTS].”
Longer excerpts of Esbati’s speech have been covered by the New York Times. In that report, “tensions surrounding these competing views on Syria preoccupied officials enough that they embarked on a campaign of damage control with the public last week. Senior military commanders and pundits close to the government held speeches and question-and-answer sessions with audiences in mosques and community centers in several cities…[Esbati] is a top commander of Iran’s Armed Forces, which includes the military and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, and has held prominent roles including commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces’ cyber division. In Syria, he supervised Iran’s military operations and coordinated closely with Syrian ministers and defense officials, outranking even the commander-in-chief of the Quds Forces, Gen. Ismail Ghaani, who oversees the network of regional militias backed by Iran.”
The following is a verbatim excerpt from the Times report.
General Esbati’s speech, on December 31 at the Valiasr mosque in central Tehran, addressed the rank and file of the military and constituents of the mosque, according to a public notice of the event titled “Answering Questions about Syria’s Collapse.” The session began with General Esbati telling the crowd that he left Syria on the last military plane to Tehran the night before Damascus fell to rebels. It concluded with him responding to questions from audience members. He offered a sobering assessment of Iran’s military capability in fighting Israel and the United States.
For the time being, Moscow analysts with military and intelligence sources who will not have overlooked Saqr’s and Esbati’s testimonies are not acknowledging them. Instead, Vzglyad has published a disclaimer regarding the Russian Army’s readiness under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the time and priority tasks required by his successor, Andrei Belousov. The following text is a verbatim translation into English, with added illustrations and captions to assist English readers in understanding the Russian references.
For the full article click here.
