Igor Strelkov (machine translated)

Thoughts on what would be good not to come true (as of 2025)

So, the situation for the Russian Federation is characterized negatively: by the end of the third year of the war, none of the tasks previously declared as “goals of the SVO” have been accomplished or are close to being accomplished:

1) The “Zelensky regime” has not been overthrown, but is holding on stronger than in 2022. “Under the war”, the “derussification” of Ukraine continued at an accelerated pace, the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate was reformed, Nazi propaganda “brainwashed” the population, hatred of Russia not only did not decrease, but also increased many times over.

2) No “demilitarization of Ukraine” was achieved. On the contrary, there is a huge (several hundred thousand) group in front of our front, armed perhaps better than before the start of the Special Military Operation, well organized, experienced, resilient and (despite war fatigue) showing no signs of imminent disintegration. Part of this group is conducting military operations on the territory of the “old regions” of the Russian Federation – in the Kursk region, from where our troops have not been able to dislodge the enemy for more than 4 months. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are increasing missile and drone attacks on the deep rear of our troops, reaching the Volga and further, hitting industrial and infrastructure facilities on a scale that is increasing month by month.

3) The territories of the “new regions” (except for the Luhansk People’s Republic) have not been liberated from the enemy: the enemy continues to firmly hold the capital and the right-bank part of the Kherson region, the capital and a significant part of the Zaporizhzhya region, significant territories of the DPR. Our successes in the Kharkov region are insignificant and have not gone beyond the purely tactical. There is no chance that all the “constitutional” territories of the Russian Federation can be liberated by military means in the near future.

To sum it up – the SVO, in the form in which it began, failed (did not achieve the set goals).

At one time, one general, looking at the field of an already lost battle, said to Napoleon: “The battle is lost, but we still have time to win the second one.” (This was in the battle of Marengo, which ended with the defeat of the seemingly victorious Austrian army). The fact is that General Desaix brought reserves with him and they completely changed the course of the battle.

Do we and the enemy have reserves?

In the first case, the answer is ambiguous. Theoretically, “yes!” There are, and very significant ones. Our country is still not at war, only the army is. The mobilization of the armed forces and industry (rear, the entire economy, etc.) has not been carried out, except for individual (non-comprehensive) measures of a “one-off” nature. As a result, we still have a significant mobilization potential, which, theoretically, could be used.

But “in practice” we have a completely opposite and depressing picture: the army, which did not receive timely and sufficient means to achieve a decisive victory, is exhausted and bled dry. Its forces are still sufficient to hold the front and even in places (“at a snail’s pace”) to move forward with difficulty, achieving purely tactical (but very “costly”) successes. But the prospects for achieving a strategic victory – to defeat the opposing enemy forces and force him (at least!) to sign peace “on our terms” are more than doubtful. Simply put – our troops can “drag out time in the hope of a lucky break” for quite a long time, but not to win. At least in their current form.

Will general mobilization help us now (I emphasize!)? – But I find it difficult to answer this question unequivocally. On the one hand, Napoleon (as in the battle of Marengo) would have been able to masterfully use all the reserves that had arrived. On the other hand, we don’t seem to have any “Napoleons” here.

The country, the army and the population are already very tired of the three-year bloody and, to put it mildly, not very successful military campaign. The industry is acutely feeling the lack of technical resources, and the reserves of military equipment, in all likelihood, are close to exhaustion (“thanks” to the “Syrian adventure”, “sales” for free/on credit from Rosoboronexport, “gifts” to “our African friends”, etc., etc.). I am not sure (I do not have the information, but I have doubts): can the Ministry of Defense now arm, clothe, shoe, train, organize, feed, form into units and formations, and then introduce into battle at least another half a million fighters? And for a strategic victory over just “Ukraine” (I emphasize!) no less is needed (and certainly not one and a half to two times more), and these half a million need to be “delivered to the front” not “by bringing water in glasses,” but immediately or (in extreme cases) in two or three stages.

In addition to the “technical issues”, a second question arises: how will the country/people react to this very general mobilization now – after “three years of bloody drudgery”? Will we not receive, instead of the long-awaited large reserves for the front, “fuel” for a revolt of the mobilized? Similar to what happened in Petrograd in February 1917? But the prerequisites for this exist, as there are (I am more than sure of this) forces ready to initiate such a revolt in the so-called “elite”, the discontent of the “liberal-Western” part of which is hardly a secret for the country’s leadership and the special services. It seems that such negative options come to my mind not only … They are possibly taken into account when determining the already openly declared (I just heard it spoken by the patriarch today) “course towards a speedy peaceful settlement”: “Peace, you say? – Well, as is well known. “A bad peace is better than a good war.”

But will Moscow live to see this “bad peace”? – I personally doubt it… And to demonstrate the validity of my doubts, I will move on to characterizing the situation (according to my estimates, of course) in the enemy camp. And I will state: while waging a total war, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have reserves. They have them now and in the near future. According to various data (that have reached me), from 150 to 300 thousand newly mobilized servicemen are undergoing combat training in EU countries. Plus, some of the military are training in the so-called “Ukraine” itself. Let’s subtract (for the sake of accuracy) 100 thousand deserters, “draft dodgers”, etc. – and still “at the end” we will get another 200 thousand enemy soldiers at the front by the spring of 2025. Let’s assume that half of them will go to replenish the broken and battered units and formations. But even 100 thousand soldiers are, in fact, 3-4 full-fledged corps (or two armies). Which the enemy is preparing (receiving equipment from the USA and Europe, which are the “inviolable rear” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces) not at all for a “truce”, but, of course, for its new offensive. And until it “burns” these (and newly created) reserves in a new attempt to break through our front – the so-called “Ukraine” will not agree to any truce. Even if it is suddenly “cut off” from the supply of weapons and equipment from the USA (from Britain, France and Germany, supplies will continue this year with a probability of 99%).

That is, there will definitely be no ceasefire in the next 4-6 months, and what happens next depends solely on how successfully and effectively our Armed Forces will repel another “attack” by a strong, experienced and well-armed enemy. I would like to believe that we will be able to repel the “offensive” as successfully as in the summer of 2023, but even when this becomes a fact rather than an assumption, the question of “what to do next?” will remain on the agenda. Since today “Ukraine” is the only one fighting against us, and who might join it tomorrow is an unclear question. But there are “candidates” – “limited participation” of NATO troops is already being discussed and has even been put on the agenda at the highest level in the EU countries. Romania’s participation in the liquidation of unfortunate Transnistria is very likely, and it is somehow even awkward to talk about the “reliability of the Turkish friend” after the events in Syria…

In order for the vultures to be afraid of “flying down on the corpse of their prey” – we must be able to show that we are “still very much alive”. And for this, again, real successes at the front are needed. And they cannot be achieved unless large and well-trained (and also controlled!) reserves are prepared.

“Our song is good – start over…”. Perhaps these words can be put in the title of this letter. If it reaches you, of course.

Igor Strelkov
07.01.2025