Reflecting on the Russian debacle in the SMO undertaken by Putin 3 years ago. There were 2 stages:
Stage One. Special forces broke through the border into Ukraine. 15% of the territory is being taken in addition to the 10% that are already under control in Donetsk and Lugansk regions. But not a single large city has been taken. The largest cities targeted by the SMO were Kherson and Melitopol.
Kharkov, Kyiv, Chernigov, and Sumy were blockaded. But there were not enough forces to take them. The main problems.
- The number of Ukrainian troops, due to mass mobilization, was 5 times greater than the number of Russian troops in the theater of military operations.
- The generals of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were breaking agreements to go over to the Russian side.
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine were not fleeing, but stubbornly fighting.
- The population was frightened and took a neutral position, rather than greeting the Russian army with jubilation, as was the case in 2014.
- Poor communication in units.
- The government of Ukraine was not falling apart.
As a result, it was not possible to establish control over the territory of Ukraine. Military actions became positional. The extended lines of communication were subject to increasing attacks.
Since Russia failed to achieve a quick victory, as everyone expected, support for the Ukrainian army from the West and from the Ukrainian population increased sharply.
Mr. Putin miscalculated by a large margin. The Russians were trapped by the better Western intelligence. It went downhill from there.
The SMO was stopped. Peace talks began in Istanbul. The Russians were scrambling to save face and were willing to sign any agreement to stabilize the situation. But they were too week to prevail, hence the rejection of the Istanbul truce.
Stage Two follows.
