Musa Khan Jalalzai is a journalist whose experience includes over 20 years extensive research in political analysis, Afghanistan, terrorism issues, and human trafficking. His articles have been published by The New Yorker, the New York Times, and Moscow Times (English-language daily). He has published several books studying sectarian and ethnic violence, policing, and terrorism in various parts of the world, as well as the increasing crime, corruption and instability in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the region. During the First Gulf War (1991-1993) he was a research scholar at the Pakistan Institute of National Affairs where he completed two books on Persian Gulf politics. Jalalzai was Executive Director of the Daily Outlook, Afghanistan (2005-2009), and is a permanent writer of articles for Pakistan's daily The Post. He has a regular column in the Daily Times (Lahore, Pakistan) and The New Nation (Bangladesh).

He notes, "This book could not have been completed without the strong encouragement and support of former Director General, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), General Asad Durrani and my Afghan friends in both the Interior and Defense Ministries of Afghanistan. I would like to thank former Chief of ISI, General Hamid Gul, who rang me up from Islamabad, Pakistan, and provided information regarding the importance of time and space in modern military conflicts. My friends Saqalain Imam of BBC Urdu Service London and Wadood Mushtaq of ARY TV Channel updated my knowledge of the war on terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

When we talk about Pakistan's nuclear weapons, armed forces and civilian governments, then controversies and uninvited and unmentionable misperceptions swirl in our minds. If we take in the broad picture, we inevitably conclude that things are not...

When we talk about Pakistan's nuclear weapons, armed forces and civilian governments, then controversies and uninvited and unmentionable misperceptions swirl in our minds. If we take in the broad picture, we inevitably conclude that things are not going in the right direction in the country; and that is because the army, politicians and the establishment perceive jihadism as a profitable business. They run this business of killings and torture through their proxies. When we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian institutions, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. The Pakistan military controls the financial market, stock exchange, real estate business, banking sector, and smuggling of narcotics. Ethnic representation within the armed forces raises serious concerns. Some experts say this is not a national army but view it as the club of Pashtun and Punjabi generals. The army has failed to develop a true ethnic representation process or motivate Baloch and Sindhis to join the armed forces; but they certainly have gained experience in killing innocent civilians.Then there is the question of the Saudi investment in Pakistan's "Islamic" nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia's link with Pakistan's nuclear and missile program has long been the source of speculation that Pakistan might either station nuclear forces on Saudi sand or provide a nuclear umbrella to the Wahabi state, in return for oil supply; or that the Saudis would purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future.

I am grateful to Mr. Musa Khan Jalalzai who requested me to write a foreword for his book. Mr. Jalalzai is the author of many books, and contributes articles in various newspapers, on counterterrorism and political issues. The present well-written...

I am grateful to Mr. Musa Khan Jalalzai who requested me to write a foreword for his book. Mr. Jalalzai is the author of many books, and contributes articles in various newspapers, on counterterrorism and political issues. The present well-written research book that mainly focuses on Pakistan's nuclear weapons, jihadism and the exponentially growing networks of Islamic State (ISIS). After Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998, the threat of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia gained the attention of the international community, with fears that terrorists could acquire materials and gain nuclear know-how. In this regard, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) categorized three potential nuclear security threats:theft of a nuclear weapon and material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device, and radioactive material. Terrorist groups are actively seeking nuclear weapons or material. There are more than 100 incidents of theft or misuse of nuclear material each year. Twenty-five countries now possess weapons usable nuclear material; and nuclear facilities are expanding into dangerous neighborhoods around the globe. The entire above mentioned are possible in Pakistan as the country's armed forces have established links with Taliban, ISIS and other extremist groups in and outside the country. However, there are speculations that extremist elements in Pakistan's armed forces who can provide nuclear material to terrorist groups to use it in India, therefore, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and Strategic Planning Division removed thousands experts, mostly of Pashtun background. The killing of Pashtun children, men and women in Swat, Tirah, FATA and Waziristan by Pakistan army caused deep ethnic divide in the country. South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) reported: "Pakistan has unfailingly proved to be a country, where hardcore sectarian and India-oriented Punjabi jihadists find widespread public and official support." There has been a considerable and increasing presence of "at least 57 extremist and terrorist groups in Punjab alone." Islamabad continues with its most dangerous friendships with purveyors of terror, even as it makes desperate efforts to contain some aspects of domestic terrorism. In a 15-minute-long video released in December 2014, TTP openly exposed the past misdeeds of the Pakistan Army. A senior leader of the group, Adnan Rashid, a former Pakistan Air Force officer, accused the Pakistan Army of taking a "U-turn" and labelling jihad as terrorism and mujahedeen as terrorists, and warned: "You remember when thousands of Pakistani youth fought your proxy war in Afghanistan and in Indian Kashmir.... And then you went into the dollar game and you earned millions from the proxy war in Afghanistan and you deceived the nation in the name of jihad. The Muslims have not forgotten the bloody game you played in Indian Kashmir, exploiting youth in the name of so called freedom..." Relations between the Pak army and terrorist organisations are not new; the army always uses these proxy groups to destabilize India and Afghanistan. Some extremists who were recruited, funded and trained by the ISI are now fighting in India and Afghanistan. A Daily Times report claimed that Maj. Haroon Ashiq received Rs, 150,000 from known terrorist Ilyas Kashmiri and killed Maj. General Faisal Alavi. "Officers of the rank of major" in the intelligence agencies with links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had been arrested "because they wanted to target army generals." Former Interior Minister Rehman Malik said. In February 2015, Dawn reported Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan directed Secretary to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reconcile a Ã?¢'¬Ã??national list' of proscribed organisations as per the blacklist of the United Nations. Officials in Interior Ministry said that the number of proscribed outfits in Pakistan reached 72 and includes 12 banned organisations. Dawn reported Interior Ministry added Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami, Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation, Ummah Tameer-i-Nau, Haji Khairullah Hajji Sattar Money Exchange, Rahat Limited, Roshan Money Exchange, Al Akhtar Trust, Al Rashid Trust, Haqqani network and Jamaatud Dawa to the list of proscribed organisations.The Punjab-based Kashmiri Islamist groups such as Harkatul Mujahedeen (HuM), and Harkatul Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), as well as sectarian outfits such as Lashkar-I-Jhangvi (LJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkatul Mujahedeen al-Alami broke off from HuM, the 313 Brigade came out of the HuJI, and Al Qanun and Al Mansur came out of the largely anti-India and hitherto Ã?¢'¬Ã??peaceful' Lashkar-e-Taiba after the commencement of the Ã?¢'¬Ã??global war on terror'. During the Operation Zarb-e-Azb, in North Waziristan, No single Ã?¢'¬Ã??good' Taliban commander was arrested. Yes, the army has arrested a good number of innocent Pashtuns and continues to prosecute them in military courts. The problem of nuclear and biological terrorism deserves special attention from the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan because the army of ISIS can develop a dirty bomb in which explosives can be combined with a radioactive source like those commonly used in hospitals or extractive industries. The use of this weapon might have severe health effects, causing more disruption than destruction. Political and military circles in Pakistan fear that, as ISIS has already seized chemical weapons in Al Muthanna, in northern Iraq, some disgruntled retired military officers or experts in nuclear sites might help the Pakistan chapter of the group deploy biological and chemical weapons. A letter from the Iraqi government to the UN warned that the militant-captured chemical weapons site contains 2,500 chemical rockets filled with the nerve agent Sarin. There is a general perception that extremist organisations in South Asia could use some advanced technologies against civilian populations. If control over these weapons is weak, the possibility of theft will increase. Each state has its own approach towards the threat perception. The more recent focus on global terrorism is also now sharpening the focus on non-proliferation activities that do not necessarily apply at the level of the state. There are speculations that non-state actors might possibly engage in these activities. The Islamic State that controls parts of Iraq and Syria has established its network in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the region is already dominated by violent terrorist groups. The New York Times reported that as many as 1,000 Turks joined the ISIS network. Last week, the CIA estimated that the group had anywhere from 20,000 to 31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State (ISIS) is clearly winning the media war. No matter how heinous their crimes, they are still able to recruit fighters from many nations, especially, from Tunisia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Europe. The threat of ISIS in Pakistan and Afghanistan is also a matter of great concern. President Ashraf Ghani expressed deep concern on the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Afghanistan, and requested that as his country's army is unable to counter this threat, the US should re-examine the current troop withdrawal timetable. Afghan Ministry of Interior also confirmed the exponential networks of ISIS in Afghanistan, while in Islamabad, Pakistan's foreign Ministry warned about the ISIS threat in the country. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmad Choudhry told the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee at Parliament House, that Islamic State was indeed a real concern. The ISIS is now demonstrating as a strong organization since the TTP, some Afghan Taliban groups, Lashkare-e-Islam and Boko Haram have joined it. There are speculations in Islamabad's establishment that Lashkar-e-Toiba may possibly join the ISIS network as well. The international community has also expressed deep concern on the existence of ISIS in Afghanistan. The head of Canada's spy agency warned that the Islamic State (ISIS) is spreading to Libya, Pakistan and Afghanistan. "Boko Haram just pledged allegiance to ISIS; so there's also this phenomenon of ISIS spreading." The spy chief said. The spread of ISIS in South Asia has major ramifications. During a hearing of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the growth of an ISIS-affiliated organization in Afghanistan would "initially pose a threat to the government of Afghanistan. The Islamic State manages a sophisticated extortion racket by robbing, looting, and demanding a portion of the economic resources in areas where it operates, which is similar to how some organized crime groups generate funds. The Islamic State has gained control of the Akashat Phosphate Mine and the Al-Qaim manufacturing plant, both located in Iraq's Al-Anbar province, and owned by the Iraqi's State Company for Phosphate Manufacture which produces both sulphuric acid and phosphoric acid. Pakistan and India is hard hit victim of extremism. Nuclear terrorism is a bigger threat. However, currently international community is only considering South Asia on the brink of nuclear terrorism. The hostile attitude of India towards Pakistan once again puts the process of peace and stability in the region at a spike. India has developed various types of tactical nuclear weapons that have threatened the security of the region. The test of Pakistan's ballistic missiles, Shaheen-III and Nasr, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, and India's ballistic missile, Prahaar and others, complicated nuclear weapons race in South Asia. India's tactical nuclear weapons are more dangerous than Pakistan's. Indian nuclear missiles like Agni-I, Agni-III, VI and V present a bigger threat to the national security of the subcontinent. India has also launched various military and surveillance satellites to enter into an anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile defence race with China. The main threat of nuclear terrorism comes from Pakistan, according to western intellectual circles, where the military and intelligence establishment has close ties terror groups. The future of the nuclear weapons race between Pakistan and India is precarious as both states continue to develop modern tactical nuclear weapons. On October 5, 2013, the foreign secretary of Pakistan said, "We have appraised India of our concerns on terrorism. If India has apprehensions about Pakistan, then we have more apprehensions than India," he said. Experts suggested that as the situation is going to deteriorate in the region, India and Pakistan need to resume talks on all issues including the Line of Control and tactical nuclear weapons. They need to work with each other on these issues that could spark an abrupt nuclear war in South Asia. Notwithstanding all efforts of the international community to help secure the nuclear weapons of both states, and as nuclear facilities and infrastructure have grown, there are concerns that security measures may not be sufficient to protect their nuclear and biological installations. The development of nuclear missiles that could be fired from a ship or submarine would give Pakistan "second-strike" capability if a catastrophic nuclear exchange destroyed all land-based weapons. Over the past two years, Pakistan conducted at least nine tests of various land-based ballistic or cruise missiles that it said were capable of delivering nuclear warheads. Pakistan is the fastest-growing nuclear state in the world. Pakistan wants to construct a fourth reactor and expanding its ability to reprocess the spent fuel from these reactors to obtain additional plutonium. Once all four reactors and associated reprocessing facilities are complete, Pakistan will be able to produce an estimated 10-12 bombs-worth of plutonium a year. The nuclear threat to South Asia is not just from its nuclear members, but also from its closest neighbour, China. China has huge interest and influence in the South Asian region. At contemporary International Relations, the countries that highly cause concern in South Asian security are India, Pakistan and additionally China. Nuclear terrorism is a grave and emerging threat to international peace and security. But no such accidents have been reported so far. But claiming that Pakistan's nuclear facilities, weapons or material are more prone to theft or terrorist attacks is something which is naive on the part of authors. The Taliban terrorists have targeted Pakistan's nuclear installations time and again while the recent attacks in Karachi and at the air force aviation base in Quetta were similar to the ones that occurred in Wah, Mehran base, Sargodha and Kamra, confirmed Southern Command Commander General Nasir Khan Janjua in his statement to journalists. He admitted that 12 terrorists were killed on the spot and 14 soldiers, including civilians, were injured during the fight in Quetta. Noor Dahri Independent Researcher in Counter Terrorism & Violent Extremism (London) Associate with International Institute for Counter Terrorism, ICT ' ISRAEL

Foreword Introduction Chapter 1. Nuclear Jihad in Pakistan: Islamic State and Talibanization of the Armed Forces Chapter 2. Black Market and the Danger of Nuclear Jihadism in Pakistan Chapter 3. Pakis

Foreword Introduction Chapter 1. Nuclear Jihad in Pakistan: Islamic State and Talibanization of the Armed Forces Chapter 2. Black Market and the Danger of Nuclear Jihadism in Pakistan Chapter 3. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons, ISIS, Taliban, and Global Concern Chapter 4. From Karachi to Peshawar, The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Is There Chapter 5. Nuclear Smuggling and the Investment of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Chapter 6. The Changing Face of Pakistan Army: Jihadism, Ethnic and Sectarian Affiliations Chapter 7. The Military and Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan Chapter 8. Civil-Military Relations Chapter 9. Military Operations and the Killing of Pashtuns and Balochs Chapter 10. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Extremist Mullahs, Internally Displaced Pakistanis, and Civil War in Afghanistan Chapter 11. Pakistani Intelligence Agencies, Extra-Judicial Killings and Mass Graves in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces Chapter 12. Intelligence Cooperation, Reforms and Intelligence Infrastructure of Pakistan Chapter 13. The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation Chapter 14. Army Backed Jihadist Groups, Paramilitary Forces and Private Militias Chapter 15. Soldiers for Sale: Pakistani Blackwater Fights in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, India and Afghanistan Chapter 16. Armed Forces, Financial Market, drug smuggling and Black Market Economy Postscript Appendix 1. Urgent Petition: Stop Pakistan Army's Crimes Against Humanity Appendix 2. Fauji Foundation or Military Business Enterprise Appendix 3. Pakistan's Nuclear Facilities Bibliography