Ukraine, Military and Financial Disaster

via Moon of Alabama

Since the mid of the year it has become clear that the war in Ukraine is one that is mainly fought by artillery.

Ukraine was clearly the underdog in that fight as the Russian forces fired eight times the amount of artillery munitions the Ukraine could make available. The U.S. and some European dependents stepped in. Some 120 M-777 guns and a myriad of modern track mounted artillery systems were given to the Ukrainian army. Hundred of tons of ammunition were moved in. The U.S. and some allies delivered HIMARS systems that could reach beyond the limits of gun artillery.

The Russian military reacted to it. It dispersed its depots and command centers thereby limiting the number of targets for HIMARS systems. It also intensified its use of electronic warfare which took down the drones the Ukrainian artillery used to find its targets:

The electronic suppression of Ukraine’s unmanned aerial vehicles blunted one of Kyiv’s biggest advantages in the early months of the war. The Ukrainians counted on superior intelligence—largely provided by UAVs—to make their smaller artillery arsenal more precise than Russia’s own, larger arsenal of big guns and rocket-launchers.

But the Russians’ electronic warfare prevented those drones from navigating and communicating—and deprived the Ukrainians of the precision they were counting on. “The defeat of precision was critical to unit survival” for the Russians, analysts Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds explained in a study for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

“The average life-expectancy of a quadcopter remained around three flights,” Zabrodskyi, Watling, Danylyuk and Reynolds wrote. “The average life-expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV was around six flights” and, “in aggregate, only around a third of UAV missions can be said to have been successful.”

Lacking real fighting capabilities the Ukrainian artillery switched towards easier fixed targets. In late November it again started to intensely bombard Donetsk city with artillery and missiles. As there are few military installations or even barracks within the city this clearly was a war against its civilian population.

‘Western’ map showing impacts in Donetsk city – December 1

Source: Live UA mapbiggerDecember 5

Source: Live UA mapbiggerDecember 18

Source: Live UA mapbigger

Russian language papers wrote about the civilian casualties caused by the carnage. The political leadership of the Donetsk Republic requested an urgent operation against the threat.

As the heavily fortified frontline makes it impossible to quickly break through and hunt the artillery behind that line, the Russian military moved to other measures. A special cell was created to wage the fight against Ukrainian artillery around Donetsk. More counter artillery radars were moved in. More satellite picture interpreters began to look for firing positions. Longer range counter battery guns also appeared.

Over the last ten days the campaign began to show significant results. Many of the recent daily reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense noted the results of this anti-artillery campaign. Here is yesterday’s one:

Within the counterbattery warfare, one U.S.-manufactured M-777 artillery system has been detected and destroyed near Netaylovo along with its crew that had shelled residential areas in Donetsk. Another M-777 artillery system has been destroyed near Preobrazhenka (Zaporozhye region).

One Uragan and two Grad multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) have been destroyed near Nevskoye (Lugansk People’s Republic) and Seversk (Donetsk People’s Republic).

Two Ukrainian 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled artillery systems have been destroyed at their firing positions near Krasnogorovka and Prechistovka (Donetsk People’s Republic).

Four Msta-B and two D-20 howitzers have been destroyed near Kupyansk (Kharkov region), Velikaya Novosyolka (Donetsk People’s Republic) and Novogrigorovka (Kherson region).

Air defence facilities have shot down three Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles near Olginka, Guselskoye (Donetsk People’s Republic) and Peremozhnoye (Zaporozhye region).

In addition, two Uragan MLRS have been intercepted near Kostogryzovo (Kherson region), and three U.S.-manufactured HARM anti-radiation missiles near Debaltsevo (Donetsk People’s Republic).

And this one from today:

Within the counterbattery warfare, two U.S.-manufactured M-777 artillery systems, and one German-manufactured FH-70 howitzer, that were used for shelling residential areas of Donetsk, have been destroyed at their firing positions near Krasnogorovka (Donetsk People’s Republic).

Three Ukrainian fighting vehicles for Grad multiple-launch rocket systems have been destroyed near Seversk.

Three Ukrainian Msta-B howitzers have been destroyed near Petropavlovka (Kharkov region), Berestovoye (Donetsk People’s Republic), and Chernobayevka (Kherson region).

Ukrainian D-20 and D-30 howitzers have been destroyed near Georgiyevka and Maryinka (Donetsk People’s Republic).

Another reports says that the reaction time between detecting and submitting target coordinates to active counter fire is down to two minutes. The setup and displacement time for a M-777 howitzer are each at least three minuteswith a fully manned and well trained crew. When radar detects a firing Ukrainian M-777 the Russian response now comes in before the gun could be moved out.

The counter battery campaign can now be called a full success. The last Ukrainian artillery impact in Donetsk city was reported on December 23. The campaign will have to continue until the Ukraine runs out of guns. Up to now the Ukrainians fire still more ammunition than the ‘west’ can produce:

“Ukrainian artillery use, conservatively, is probably around maybe 90,000 rounds per month,” Michael Kofman, the director of Russian studies at C.N.A., a Virginia research institute, said last week on the “War on the Rocks” podcast. “That’s a lot more than anybody makes in the West right now. So all of this has been coming out of stocks, which is like going through your saving accounts.”

With less guns available on the Ukrainian side the need for new ammunition will decrease.

That is bad news for those Ukrainians who man the frontline trenches. The heavy artillery fire they are under will only intensify and increase their already very high losses. In some time and some places the lines will break and leave space for the Russian military to move through.

The current fighting is concentrated around Bakhmut/Artyomovsk. The Ukrainian command has thrown in reserves to hold the city.

Source: Military Landbigger

Under permanent Russia artillery fire the sixteen brigades currently deployed in and behind Bakhmut will be decimated one by one. It is a slow fight where the lines move only little by little in favor of the Russian side. But it is very effective battle in a war designed to demilitarize Ukraine. Due to very uneven artillery fight the Ukrainian losses will be many times higher than the Russian ones.

On the economic side the Ukraine has already lost the war. It is living off loans from ‘western’ governments it will surely default on:

The Ukrainian government has struggled to raise money on bond markets during the war and is paying investors more than it is collecting, according to a Central Bank statement that points to the country’s deepening dependence on foreign aid.

The economy has been projected to shrink about 40 percent this year, drying up tax revenue and indefinitely delaying previously planned spending that would have spurred growth.The Central Bank statement, published on Monday, pointed to a less visible side of Ukraine’s financing shortfalls caused by the war: an inability to raise money on the market. Since Russia invaded on Feb. 24, Ukraine has not been able to roll over debt accumulated before the war. The country paid investors about $2.2 billion more than it collected in bond sales in that time, the Central Bank said.

All of that has left Ukrainian public finance, which has been wobbly at the best of times in the post-independence period, deeply reliant on assistance from the United States, the European Union, European countries that donate individually and other donors.

Even the U.S. controlled IMF is unwilling to throw more money into that black hole:

The budget passed by Ukraine’s Parliament for next year includes a deficit of about $36 billion. About half of the planned expenditures are for the army, the police and other military outlays. The deficit this year has run even higher, at about $5 billion a month.The International Monetary Fund, which bailed out Ukraine through a long run of post-independence financial crises, has not continued large-scale lending during the war.

“They are worried about debt sustainability,” said Tymofiy Mylovanov, a former economy minister who is a professor at the Kyiv School of Economics. “If the I.M.F. is worried about debt sustainability and ability to finance, imagine what private investors are thinking.”

In contrast international trade with Russia has been booming this year and its financial numbers, recently mentioned by its president Putin, look better than those in the ‘west’:

First, the predicted economic collapse did not happen. True, we have posted a decline, and I will repeat the figures. There have been promises – or predictions or hopes maybe – that Russia’s economy will contract. Some said its GDP would drop by 20 percent or more, by 20–25 percent. True, there is a decline in GDP, but not 20–25 percent; it is in fact 2.5 percent. That is the first thing.Second. Inflation, as I said, will be a little more than 12 percent this year – it is one of the most important indicators, too. This, I think, is much better than in many other countries, including the G20 countries. Inflation is not good of course, but it being smaller than in other countries is good.

Next year – we have mentioned this, too – we will strive for the 4–5 percent target, based on the economy’s performance in the first quarter – at least, we hope so. And this is a very good trend, unlike in some other G20 countries, where inflation is on the rise.

Unemployment is at a historic low of 3.8 percent. We are running a budget deficit, this is true, but it is only 2 percent this year, next year too, then it is projected at one percent, and less than one percent in 2025: we are expecting about 0.8 percent. I would like to point out that other countries – both large developing economies and the so-called developed market economies – are running a much greater deficit. In the United States, I think, it is 5.7 percent, and in China, it is over 7 percent. All major economies are running deficits above 5 percent. We are not.

This is a good foundation for moving confidently into 2023.

When the war ends the Ukraine will have an incredible amount of debt that it will not be able to pay for in generations. It will have no more land to sell off to foreigners and no industry left that will be of any value.

The people who had thought up, designed and implemented the ‘western’ sanction war against Russia have done more damage to Ukraine and the ‘west’ that anyone had imagined. But they utterly failed to hurt Russia. They should all be fired for their demonstrated incompetence.

Had the Soviet Union Been Preserved . . .

With the Soviet Union intact, Russia could now have had 172 million people living in it, and a 67% higher economy and income.

As a result of the destruction of the Soviet Union, Russia has lost 26 million people, 40% of its economy, and 66% of its industry, various sources have estimated. This is the difference between the actual figures and the alternative figures that would have developed under the Soviet growth rate averaged over 1980-1989.

Population loss: – 26 million 

According to the USSR Goskomstat forecast of 1990, the RSFSR could have 172.4m people by the end of 2022. But in fact, it is now 146.4 million. 

Loss of income: – 41%

The average monthly disposable income of 80% of Russians (without the rich) in 2022 will be around 25,550 rubles. At the Soviet growth rate and level of inequality, they would have been 43,000 roubles, or 68% more.

Losses to the economy: – 40%

“As you know,” there was “stagnation” in the 1980s. In 1985, economic growth slowed to as much as 2.3%, which was used as an excuse to start perestroika. But at that rate of growth, the GDP would have been 2.1 times bigger now than it was in 1990, not 26%, as in fact it was. Russia’s economy (GDP at PPP) was $7.7 trillion instead of $4.6 trillion and would have ranked 4th in the world after China, the USA, and India.

Production losses – 66%

Agricultural losses – 44%

Asset losses – 56%

Geopolitical losses – 32%

A similar assessment of the effects of the 1941-1945 war showed that Russia’s population lost 20 million people, as estimated by Rosstat. The economy of Soviet Russia lost 44%, industry lost 41%, and agriculture lost 43%. The country lost 45% of its wealth, and the population lost 37% of its income.

As we can see, the destruction of the USSR and the transition from socialism to capitalism, that is, to a lower stage of social development, caused losses in Russia that are comparable to the losses from Hitler’s occupation in 1941-1945. If we look further and consider the split of the sister republics and the world-historical consequences, the destruction of the Soviet Union is the biggest geopolitical catastrophe in the history of mankind.

#research #USSR

The Making of the Soviet Union, Lenin and Stalin on Opposite Sides

By Alexander Nepogodin, an Odessa-born political journalist, expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union.

Exactly 100 years ago, on December 30, 1922, the largest country in world history was created. At the First All-Union Congress of Soviets, representatives of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and Belarusian SSR, and the Transcaucasian Federation all signed Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the USSR.

The huge country left an ambiguous legacy, and most of the Bolsheviks’ promises were never fulfilled. However, despite its collapse in 1991, to this day the history of the Soviet Union remains relevant for residents of Russia and the former Soviet republics. In fact, it was the beginning of Bolshevik rule that marked the national revival of minorities and the creation of republics that received not only autonomy, but also the right to secede from

RT recalls how the decision to create the USSR was made and why its structure was determined by a dispute between the “red chiefs” – Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.

According to Lenin’s original plan, the USSR was not really meant to be a “state” from the point of view of “state structure.” It was supposed to be a free confederation of independent states (republics), each having nearly full sovereignty. That’s where the phrase “self-determination up to secession” came from. The unity of this formation was ensured not by “state” or “supranational” mechanisms, but by a single ruling Communist party.

Such a model assumed the possibility of the USSR’s unlimited expansion, up to a global scale. Any country could merely recognize the Communist Party as a “ruling and guiding force” and integrate into the Soviet Union as a new republic. That is why the formula of self-determination up to secession did not particularly concern the leader of the world proletariat, Vladimir Lenin. After all, if communism won over the whole world, where and for what reason would its republics secede? “We still have to conquer five-sixths of the earth’s landmass to have the USSR all over the world,” proclaimed chairman of the 5th Congress of the Comintern, Grigory Zinoviev, in June 1924.

This logic applied not only in the 1920s, but also after the end of World War II, when the Belarusian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR became co-founders of the UN, having their own foreign policy departments. When the “global growth” model was transformed during perestroika, it became apparent that the Soviet republics were held together within the Soviet Union only by a bureaucratic management system. The concept of a single space was doomed. As a whole, the USSR could only exist within the framework of its historical mission, “the construction of communism.”

FILE PHOTO. © Sputnik

Autonomy or federalization?

In June 1919, the RSFSR, Belarusian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR officially united their armed forces, economy, finance, transport, and mail services. The role of national authorities was assigned to the Russian people’s commissariats – analogues of ministries. Republican communist parties joined the Russian Communist Party-Bolsheviks, or ‘RCP(b)’ as territorial organizations. A paradox then arose: the entire territory controlled by the Bolsheviks was governed as a single state, while the republics formally remained independent.

For the Bolsheviks, this meant little – the Communist Party held a monopoly over politics and decision-making anyway. However, following the end of the acute phase of the Civil War, the problem of external representation arose. On the eve of the international debut of the new government, at the Genoa Conference in April-May 1922, it was decided that a delegation of the RSFSR would speak for all the republics. But in the future, foreign partners wanted to clearly see who they were dealing with. Moreover, the country’s own population had to understand where they lived.

Joseph Stalin was the party’s specialist in interethnic relations (although, according to rumors, Nikolai Bukharin could have been involved in writing his main work “Marxism and the National Question”). As the RSFSR People’s Commissar of Nationality Affairs responsible for working out the issue, he proposed to include the remaining republics in the RSFSR as autonomous entities. In autonomization, Stalin saw a means of solving several problems at once. Firstly, it could strengthen a single national space and create a rigid vertical alignment of power. And secondly, it would weaken local nationalists and “social-independents” who advocated the full sovereignty of the Soviet republics and were annoyed by the interference of the central government in their affairs. At the same time, the central power and the all-Russian legislation would extend to new territories. Essentially, the plan did not envisage the unification and formation of a new state, but an absorption of the national Soviet republics by the RSFSR.

In September 1922, Joseph Stalin sent his project to Vladimir Lenin and soon presented the program of “autonomization” before the preparation commission for the Central Committee Plenum on the Relationship Between the RSFSR and Other Soviet republics. The commission, chaired by Vyacheslav Molotov, met on September 23-24, 1922, and managed to approve the plan developed by Stalin. Now it had to be approved at the plenum of the Central Committee, which was scheduled for October 5. However, Lenin, who was in an unstable condition at the time due to deteriorating health, refused to accept the project and demanded the creation of the USSR according to the model of maximum federalization – that is, with semi-independent Union republics.

Vladimir Lenin.

His proposal would not only create tension within the party, but also show the world an example of a “fundamentally new solution to the national question.” Lenin insisted on the creation of equal treaties between the republics with the possibility of other non-capitalist countries around the world joining the Soviet Union in the future. This included creating a new constitution and forming federal authorities with representatives from all republics. The Soviet Union was conceived by its ideologists as a global communist project, open, among other things, to the accession of those countries that were never part of the disintegrated Russian Empire. This was a serious argument for those who criticized Stalin’s plan of autonomization. After all, focusing on the world revolution as a global project, the federation was seen as the most convenient structure of the state, since it would be easier to include new subjects.

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At the same time, appeasing some of the nationally oriented Bolsheviks was also an important issue. Some influential national communists, who were especially strong in the Ukrainian SSR and Transcaucasian SFSR (especially among Georgians), opted for the prospect of confederation since they wanted a greater degree of freedom.

This is most clearly evidenced by the so-called “Georgian incident.” On October 20, 1922, at a meeting of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the RCP(b) a dispute arose between Grigory (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze and the Georgian Bolsheviks on whether Georgia should enter the USSR as part of the Transcaucasian SFSR or independently. When Ordzhonikidze called his opponents “chauvinistic rot,” one of them, Akaki Kabakhidze, called Ordzhonikidze “Stalin’s donkey,” and Ordzhonikidze hit him in the face.

The central power had to intervene, and a Central Committee commission headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky headed to Transcaucasia. Without even talking to the other side, its representatives sided with Ordzhonikidze. Lenin, however, no less strongly supported the Georgian Bolsheviks and demanded that Ordzhonikidze be expelled from the party for assault. At the same time, both Stalin and Lenin understood that the incident, spurred by feelings of nationalism, was a serious issue that could have consequences for the future of the state.

FILE PHOTO. Leaders of the Russian revolution, from left to right, Joseph Stalin, Nikolai Bukharin, Grigory Ordzhonikidze and Janis Rudzutaks from reviewing stand in Red Square, circa 1930 in Moscow, Russia. © Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images

A ticking time bomb

Discussions on autonomization and federalization lasted throughout the autumn of 1922 and ended with the victory of Lenin’s project. Shortly before the signing of the treaty, Lenin summoned Stalin to his Gorki residence near Moscow and demanded he change the first paragraph. Soon, he wrote the note “On the formation of the USSR” to politburo members in which he expressed the opinion that the RSFSR should recognize itself as equal with other republics and enter the union “together and on an equal footing with them.” Lenin made concessions, and both political and territorial compromises.

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This was motivated by the fear that a single administrative apparatus would lead to bureaucrats discriminating against peoples in remote parts of the union. “It is necessary to distinguish between the nationalism of an oppressive nation and the nationalism of an oppressed nation, the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small nation. In relation to the latter nationalism, almost always in historical practice, we, the nationals of a large nation, find ourselves guilty of an infinite amount of violence. Moreover, we commit an infinite amount of violence and insults without noticing it,” he wrote. Stalin, however, stood by his opinion and in a note to the members of the politburo called Lenin’s position “national liberalism.” Yet the authority of the leader of the world proletariat, despite his serious illness, remained unquestionable.

The morning of December 29, 1922, was lively outside the Bolshoy Theater in Moscow. Figures in overcoats, commissar’s leather uniforms, and national costume floated out of the frosty fog. Delegates of the First All-Union Congress of Soviets were gathering to establish a new state. On the same day, the delegations of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Belarusian SSR, as well as the Transcaucasian SFSR signed an Agreement on the Formation of the USSR. A day later, it was approved, and December 30 became the day of the formation of the Soviet Union, which existed for almost 69 years.

Except for issues concerning foreign policy and foreign trade, finance, defense, and communications, which were transferred over to the Union authorities, each republic had jurisdiction over all remaining areas. The All-Union Congress of Soviets became the supreme body of the country. Between its convocations, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, consisting of two chambers – the Union Council and the Council of Nationalities, was established.

Soviet poster reading “The USSR is a new type of state”

The adopted declaration outlined the reasons, principles, and goals for the unification of the Soviet republics. The most important principle was the right of peoples to self-determination, and the ultimate goal was the creation of a World Union of Communist Republics.

“Access to the [Soviet] Union is open to all socialist Soviet republics, both existing and future. The new Union State will serve as a stronghold against world capitalism and a decisive step towards uniting the working people of all countries into a World Socialist Soviet Republic,” stated the first Constitution of the USSR, adopted on January 31, 1924.

Do Russians want the Soviet Union back?

The new state was deliberately given supranational character, so that in the future any “Soviet socialist republic” could be accepted into it. Advocating the liquidation of the state as such, the Bolsheviks saw only a temporary solution in such a state structure. Initially, Lenin even proposed to call the state the “Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia,” but eventually it was decided to avoid geographical references. The USSR coat of arms is the only example of its kind where the entire globe is depicted but state borders are not marked in any way.

A failed project

However, the hopes of the “Old Bolsheviks” for a world revolution were not fulfilled, and the system created with this perspective in mind could not resist the onslaught of new realities. The thesis of “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist world was established soon after the Second World War in the mid-1950s, although Vyacheslav Molotov found it “disorienting” until the end of his long life. This wasn’t incidental, since Molotov saw the USSR enter into another race with the United States, in addition to the “arms race” – the race for “quality of life” – also lost by the Soviet system. It turned out that outside of the task of spreading communism in the world, the Soviet Union, as a whole, was an impossibility.

FILE PHOTO. © Sputnik/Ramil Sitdikov

Ultimately, the practical fulfillment of the right of nations to self-determination played out as a cruel joke. Shortly after the creation of the USSR, a process of nation-building was launched in the new Soviet republics. The 185 nationalities of the Soviet Union were divided into union republics directly subordinated to the central authority. These included autonomous republics within the Union republics, autonomous regions within the territories, and national districts. At the same time, it was determined which of the subjects should have rights and privileges, and which should not. For example, each national republic had its own Communist Party and academy of sciences, but Russians were not allowed to have these. Following the foundation of the USSR, the RSFSR was entirely sterilized of state infrastructure.

The new borders between the republics, largely drawn up with economic needs and Communist rationality in mind, also caused discontent. For example, Abkhazians and Ossetians did not want to be part of the Georgian SSR, and the Russians who lived in Donbass did not want to be governed by the Ukrainian SSR. Some majority Tajik regions became part of the Uzbek SSR, and Nagorno-Karabakh, with a predominantly Armenian population, was included in the Azerbaijani SSR.

Subsequently, all these issues caused the aggravation of interethnic conflicts and the implementation of the republics’ right to secession, preserved in all Union constitutions. This right was first invoked in 1990 by the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Georgian SSRs. Their example was eventually followed by almost all the other republics, of which there were fifteen in the “classic” composition of the USSR. The attempt made in 1991 by the first and last President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, to prepare and agree on a new version of the Union Treaty was unsuccessful not only because of the attempted coup by part of the leadership in August, but also because of cardinal disagreements on the division of powers between the central authority and the republics, including the budget issue.

In December 1991, the Supreme Soviets of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia announced the denunciation of the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR. The corresponding resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR was canceled by the State Duma of Russia in March 1996, but the deputies clarified that their decision did not affect the sovereignty of Russia and other former Soviet republics.

What To Give Hitler this Christmas

By John Helmer, Moscow


Set your clocks forward from 1337 and from 1618.

We are in Europe’s second Hundred Years War, and at the end of the first year of Europe’s second Thirty Years War. What we have to look forward to next year is an armistice on the Ukrainian battlefield, but not an end to the war.

This is because President Biden (lead image, front 1st right) aims to fight it until Russia’s destruction, as do Olaf Scholz (rear left), Andrzej Duda (rear, centre), Vladimir Zelensky (rear, right), Giorgia Meloni (front, half, right) and Emmanuel Macron (front, full right). Like the European princelings and principates who fought each other to standstill and penury the last time around, none of them has long to look forward to, and certainly no victory-in-Europe parade.

Russia’s offer to them for the future, for mutual security without defeat on the battlefield, was tabled as treaties of non-aggression and security for Europe last Christmas, on December 17, 2021. After the Russian offer was dismissed by Biden and the others a month later, President Vladimir Putin had no choice but to launch the special military operation. This is now a general military operation because Biden and his allies have committed themselves to that. Scholz’s one hundred billion Euro rearmament of Germany to reinvigorate the war against Russia after the armistice on the Ukrainian battlefield leaves Zelensky’s Ukraine with a future shrinking as fast as his territorial capacity to threaten; Scholz’s Germany ditto.

Hitler is in this picture because the ruination of Europe and the US in fighting this war can only be sustained inside their countries by the methods of fascism – force, fraud and propaganda — which Hitler introduced more systematically than had been attempted before; and before he ran into a Russian army which was magnitudes weaker than it is today.

Today we are in a fresh war for Europe, Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared this week. “It is well known that the military potential and capabilities of almost all major NATO countries are being widely used against Russia,” Putin said. “Today in Ukraine, Russia is fighting against the collective forces of the West,” Shoigu added.

In their speeches at the National Defence Control Centre on December 21, they presented the expansion of the Russian Army to a fighting size which has not been seen for a hundred years, with capacities which have never been seen before.

A day later, General Valery Gerasimov (right), the Chief of the Russian General Staff, added details in his briefing to foreign military attachés in Moscow. He also redrew the map of the general war from the 815-kilometre Ukraine front northwards to the continental shelf beyond Russia’s exclusive economic zone in the Arctic, and southwards to the Asia-Pacific region from the Russian Kuriles to US bases around Darwin, in Australia; that’s a front of almost 6,500 kms.

The Russian warfighting clock – that’s the one on the wall of the General Staff — started when the troops of the British and their empire, allied with the US, Germans, French, Czechs, and Japanese started their march toward St Petersburg and Moscow in 1918; the Japanese reopened their offensive in 1937; the Germans in 1941.

Next to this clock on this wall are the invasion maps of 1918 and 1941. They are more than souvenirs of Russia’s defeats of every invasion attempted against the country over the past hundred years. They are the reminder for those Russians who believed until February 24, or who still believe, that non-aggression security pacts with the US and NATO and a peace treaty with Japan can be negotiated, signed and honoured with the leaders of those countries – without an armistice enforced by the Russian Army. It is now clear that without that, treaty papers are fraud and propaganda, and therefore worthless in the territorial defence of Russia. Force, fraud and propaganda, we must keep repeating, are the methods of fascism.




In retrospect, you can see that all the arrows on these maps represent the hopes of those states whose leaders are now aiming to try again. Their propaganda keeps reassuring them that the hopes will not be in vain this time round – that they are already winning against Russia. If you let hopes like these come down your chimney this Christmas, you had better have an alternative source of supply of heat, light, and water.

This is the season for hope, and even in war hope dies last.

That was the 168th of Francois de La Rochefoucauld’s maxims, to which he added: “though it be exceedingly deceitful, yet it is of this good use to us, that while we are traveling through life it conducts us in an easier and more pleasant way to our journey’s end.” Himself one of the great losers in the civil warfighting of 17th century France, La Rochefoucauld was in chronic pain from battle wounds when he composed that one. Much earlier he had composed his 38th maxim: “We promise according to our hopes; we perform according to our fears.”

The task of our work this year past, and for the new year coming, is to report the hopes and fears of others – the Bears with whom we have been dancing these past 33 years – and to perform according to the truth. Fears we have for them, to be sure, as for ourselves. But if we perform according to our fears, then we too will turn into fraud and propaganda. We count on you, dear reader, to keep watch.

The Neutering Bomb Paralyses Millions of Minds

By John Helmer, Moscow

If you pay government taxes, you have done your bit and contributed to the one hundred billion dollars which the US and its allies have spent on the Ukrainian battlefield since the year began. And if you are German, you are going to be paying one hundred billion Euros in next year’s Berlin rearmament programme aimed at fighting Russia and China.

Next, if you think that in these outlays you are making a winning investment in securing the defence of your frontiers, of your democratic freedoms and your constitutional and human rights, you are suffering the first-wave blast effect of the neutering bomb.

Since the US Army’s PROJECT DOVE tested the first neutron bomb in 1964, the concept has been established in US and NATO warfighting manuals for waging war by destroying people but not buildings, electricity grids, or the infrastructure of their economies. Almost fifty years later, since 2014 the new warfighting concept has been in testing. This is not to destroy Russians or the inhabitants of the Donbass – there are regular bombs, missiles and artillery shells for them, and you are paying the bill.

The new concept is the neutering bomb. This has been designed to destroy the minds of Americans, Germans, other Europeans, British, Canadians and Australians, but leave them at work to keep paying their taxes, voting for their members of parliament, and paying subscriptions to keep reading newspapers and magazines which warn against suspecting this  scheme of things is a grand fraud and a big lie.

The suspicion is impossible because of the secondary effect of the neutering bomb.  This is neurological. Your ears hear, and your eyes read. But you can no longer detect fabrication and falsehood. This is the Novichok effect – paralysis of the brain box from droplets you have been told were squeezed by Russian soldiers on to your front doorknobs;  in your perfume atomisers; and  inside your underpants.

Believe that – and, well, not only are you ready to accept any preposterousness you hear or read, but you are displaying the symptoms of having been N-bombed, neutralized, casualty of war, one of the walking wounded.

Depending on how severely you have been exposed, there may be no medical treatment, no antidote.

CDC’s Handbook for Schools in Matters of Gender Identification

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has come out with a new tool to help school teachers indicate how “LGBTQ inclusive” their classrooms are. The agency has encouraged educators to commit to change if an inclusivity level isn’t as high as needed.

It is claimed that approximately 5 percent of young adults (1.6 percent of all adults) in the U.S. identify as transgender or nonbinary, that is up from 0.36 percent in 2016.

The CDC’s Division of Adolescent and School Health announced the self-assessment handbook in a tweet on Tuesday, urging school administrators to undergo the test and “learn ways to increase inclusivity.”

The tweet links to a handbook that features a number of statements regarding “inclusivity.” Educators are asked to score how much these statements apply to them and what they do. The document also offers a set of changes that teachers could implement based on their self-assessment score.

The highest-scoring participants of the volunteer test are labeled as “awesome allies”while those with a mid-score are ranked as “moderately inclusive” who are “beginning to break through.”

As for the lowest-scoring educators, they are deemed “minimally inclusive” and are urged to “commit to change” and provided with a plethora of links and tools to help improve their scores. That includes taking Harvard University’s “implicit bias test” and using the so-called “genderbread person” and “gender Unicorn” diagrams.

To achieve the highest score, teachers are asked to agree with a number of statements such as “My classroom or learning space includes visual labels (e.g. rainbow flags, pink triangles, unisex bathroom signs) marking it as a safe space for LGBTQ students.”

Participants are also ranked on how much they advocate for LGBTQ issues. According to the handbook, “allies” are expected to correct those around them if they use “outdated, derogatory or harmful language or terminology,” advocate for LGBTQ materials in the classroom and participate in their school’s Gay Straight Alliance/Genders and Secualities Alliance.

The last page of the document states that the handbook was published in October 2020, meaning the CDC appears to have been distributing this “self-assessment tool” in US schools for the past two years.

Ukraine War Analysis. Phase 3

by Aleks (edited by Algora)


Welcome to my analysis of the third phase of the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine. Phase 3? Yes, Phase 3. We have only a few references from Russian officials about the phases. Especially, when Phase 2 officially started, we had some remarks from Russian officials about that. And that’s all. That’s why I decided  to make my own classification of phases of this war. I have presented them already in a few articles. Especially, you can read about it in the analysis of Phase 2.

According to the Black Mountain classification, we are still in Phase 3. That means that this analysis will contain events that have already happened, and inevitably it will contain some predictions of how events could unfold going forward. Phase 3 roughly began in August 2022 and is still ongoing.

Since many important events took place and are going to take place, I will need to keep my chapters short.

Even so, as I pointed out in the reference to my phase classifications, I will summarize the definition of Phase 3 below:

Phase 3 was activated when NATO escalated its supply, command and control of the Ukrainian forces. This prevented them from collapsing in Phase 2. The purpose of Phase 3 is to destroy the Ukrainian matériel and human potential in regions that are militarily favorable for the Russians, and to overstretch both the Ukrainian and the NATO logistics in Ukraine as much as it is possible, and thus to trigger a total Ukrainian collapse and hence its total defeat. This would be accomplished by using strikes on both its logistics and energy infrastructure, to accelerate the result.

This article is going to explain this in detail.


Phase 1

Read my article about Phase 1.

Phase 2

Read my article about Phase 2.


I will cite Clausewitz here, as I did several times already. “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.” One wins a war by achieving the objectives set by the political leadership. And here I will point out the objectives, as I did in the last two analyses. This is important to reiterate as many times as possible. Why? Because most commentators always forget what the objectives are and keep trying to analyse or criticize the war based on the assumption that the war is fought for the sole purpose of fighting a war. This is utterly wrong.

These are the objectives, set by the Russian leadership:

  1. Denazification of Ukraine.
  2. Demilitarization of Ukraine.
  3. Bring to justice those Ukrainians that have committed (war) crimes against its own population from 2014 onwards.
  4. Free the Donbass and ensure its independence and security.

These are the sole objectives of the Special Military Operation (SMO).

I will explain in detail how the implementation will most likely be achieved.

Personnel Situation in the Russian Army

Phase 3 began in August 2022. August was a difficult month for the Russian army.

Many Russian soldiers signed up for a certain period. For example, for half a year. Due to the necessity of secrecy, most soldiers didn’t know for certain that there would be war and that THEY would participate in this war. All contracts were issued with normal service periods in order to preserve secrecy. This eventually led to the situation that a not insignificant part of the Russian professional invasion army saw their contracts expire at the end July 2022.

I don’t have exact numbers and I won’t throw around made-up numbers. What I do know is that far more soldiers left the army, due to expiring contracts, than new troops could be brought in. In fact, this means that from August 2022 onwards, the size of the Russian forces in Ukraine decreased significantly.

However, the line of contact still had the same length. Which means, less troops per mile (density) than before. Since in reality we don’t have Y soldiers every X miles, this is just an average. In reality less regions/villages were manned with Russian troops. Yes, Russia used the Donbass militia extensively, but they were not enough to fight off the whole rest of Ukraine and NATO mercenaries. Which, by the way, they shouldn’t do at all.

Summarizing, we can conclude that the personnel situation for the Russians deteriorated sharply in August 2022.

Training and Equipment from Abroad for Ukraine

Ukraine, on the other hand, started to mobilize as many able-bodied citizens as possible from the beginning of the war. First, they were used to plug the gaps and to establish a defence along the whole line of contact and to build up reserves. Then, newly recruited soldiers were used to plug the holes on the frontline. In Phase 2, the grinding consumed tens of thousands of troops at the frontlines in dead and wounded.

But during Phase 2, Ukraine reached a point where they stabilized the situation. The ratio of casualties on the frontlines and the recruiting of new troops became stable and the best of the mobilized people could be separated to be sent abroad for training. The situation occurred that Ukraine mobilized people, on the one hand, to be immediately and almost without training, into the trenches to plug holes, and on the other hand, to be sent abroad for training.

Why send them abroad? Why train them at all and not use them right away on the frontlines, to turn the war? NATO correctly understood that Russia has superiority in almost everything. Only not in the numbers of troops committed to Ukraine. That’s why plans were designed to train and equip huge numbers of troops abroad, where they can’t be targeted during or right after the training. They would be trained according to NATO standards to be used in particular in predesigned operations, to fully exploit Russia’s biggest weakness: the number of soldiers it has in Ukraine.

Several tens of thousands, some sources say up to one hundred thousand, troops were trained in the EU states. Equipped with NATO equipment, their task would be to attack strategic Russian positions with human wave techniques and stress Russian logistics and their concentration of forces at several sections so much that Russian forces simply would collapse. As described in the analysis of Phase 2, the Ukrainians’ only chance is to exploit the fact that Russia is conducting a SMO and not a full-scale war. Thereby it has only a limited number of troops committed. If these troops were outmanoeuvred, they would do one of the following things:

  • Retreat from a certain section to avoid being overrun and defeated.
  • Find themselves cut off from supplies and eventually either captured as POWs or killed for propaganda purposes.

We have already experienced the first of the two possibilities several times. Not the second.

Ukraine’s approach

Russia was fully aware of the fact that it needs to handle a war with limited human resources, while NATO is trying to exploit this fact, by using a pool of human resources that must not  be extended so much as to collapse vital functions of the state. This point has already been reached, as I write this text.

Therefore, the Russian planners needed to design a strategy that would include a lot of manoeuvres, pinning down, and deceptions. Only in this way could Russia handle such a far-larger enemy force. In the end we saw that it still was not enough, but I will come to this point later.

Now let’s take a look at several events to work out the strategies applied .

The Ukrainians announced early on that they would start an offensive on Kherson and eventually on Crimea. Obviously, it is rather strange if someone announces its military strategy in advance. But it looks like the Russians had intelligence that it must be true and they prepared accordingly. A large Russian formation was deployed west of the Dnieper. Not only a large force, but a very elite one as well. Many paratrooper units were deployed here, which are not designed for such long-term defensive operations. It is a sign, of being overstretched.

As far as I can see, the forces committed to the Kherson front were absolutely sufficient to hold the line. And they did. Eventually the Ukrainians actually started the announced large-scale offensive on Kherson in August. Every wave of Ukrainians was defeated. The situation caused several tens of thousands of casualties on the Ukrainian side by the time of its preliminary end in November 2022.

I heard many sources and scenarios. And I concluded that the following scenario was the most probable. It looks like the NATO command planned to block huge numbers of Russia’s troops, especially the most elite ones, in Kherson, while secretly preparing another large-scale offensive in Kharkov (Russian held territories of Kharkov) and use it as a lever to apply maximum pressure on the Russian Donbass operations. Eventually, that would trigger a collapse of the front in Donbass, coming from the North.

This could have worked indeed, had Russia not mobilized. (Most soldiers that left the army after their contract expired in July/August 2022 were directly re-mobilized and recommitted on their positions without additional training. They were already experienced. So, the northern Donbass front could have been directly stabilized.)

The NATO plan was thwarted. Now the next approach was to cut off the most experienced Russian troops on the West Bank of the Dnieper. Defeating them or taking them prisoner would have been the last big chance to win the war. Why, win the war? We need to remember, as I pointed out in the analysis of Phase 1 and 2, that if a party achieves the objectives, as set by the political leadership, it has won. It doesn’t matter how many casualties etc. were taken. Well, I pointed out in these articles that Ukraine’s goals are the Western/NATO goals and these are simple… We can break them down to: “Collapse Russia as a state and remove President Putin.”

If we think about it, it becomes clear that if 40,000 Russian troops, many of them elite ones, were trapped at the West Bank of the Dnieper, they couldn’t be saved. They would be either annihilated or taken prisoner. What does it mean to be “trapped” on the West Bank? Well, after the mobilization was announced, it was pretty clear to the West that the former plans were void. They had one last chance of triggering a collapse in Russia: cutting off the Russian grouping on the West Bank of the Dnieper . . .. by destroying the dam at the Kakhovka reservoir.

Ukraine accumulated some 60,000 troops, or more, for such an operation. If the dam were destroyed, Russian logistics would collapse immediately. Without logistics Russia couldn’t hold the West Bank. Especially not against such a large grouping.

Whether this plan had any chance to succeed or not, I don’t know. What I know is that the newly appointed commander of the SMO, General Surovikin, decided that it’s not worth the risk and decided to withdraw all troops to the left side of the Dnieper.

This decision has two implications:

  1. The Russian troops are safe.
  2. NATO’s last chance to win the war was thwarted. Considering the fact that soon, most likely in December, another 220,000 Russian mobilized troops will arrive on the battlefield or in the rear, there is no theoretical chance or possibility left that would conclude in a Ukrainian victory. Essentially, by withdrawing from Kherson city, Russia killed all hopes the West had of achieving any kind of victory or negotiation leverage (several thousand Russian POWs). It is over. Only, the killing will continue now, until the Ukrainians collapse.

For a detailed analysis of the withdrawal and all military implications (as opposed, to the geo strategic considerations, pointed out above) read my according article.

The main front, though, is neither Kharkov nor Kherson. It is indeed the Donbass, since it is the strategic goal of Russia to free it. Most troops and equipment are concentrated in Donbass and offensive operations are being conducted, since the beginning, along the whole line of contact.

You might ask why there is no progress? I will come later to this, and I explained it already in the analysis of Phase 2, but it is very favourable for Russia to fight exactly at this position. Let the Ukrainians transport all their troops, supplies, equipment across the whole of Ukraine and go the same way back for repairs. Fight in a hostile environment. The Donbass population is clearly most pro-Russian of all regions in Ukraine. Most likely most of the civilians are already gone anyway. Which means, Russia can simply let the Ukrainians come and kill them over and over again. This is exactly what is happening. The Ukrainians are frequently rotating  totally reduced formations (brigades and battalions) out and replenishing them with newly formed and mobilized ones. Some call it a meatgrinder.

Moreover, Russia has total air dominance in Donbass and very short supply lines to Russia. It is the perfect spot now, to keep fighting there. The only reason why it is still working is that the Ukrainians can’t give up one inch of their territory, because all the support of the Western citizens would immediately collapse if they saw the truth, that their support and their own suffering (Europe deindustrializing and deenergizing) is in vain. Perfect conditions for Russia to destroy the whole Ukrainian army at favourable places under its dictated conditions.


I mentioned it in several articles. NATO knows exactly that their only possibility to win the war is to deliver such a defeat in a single battle to Russia that it would cause mass protests in Russia. And eventually a coup against Putin. Hence, taking prisoner some 40,000 troops or similar events (I know, exaggerated, but only to highlight the strategy). This is only possible as long as Ukraine is able to exploit the biggest Russian weakness: the finite and low number of Russian troops in Ukraine. I described above the Ukrainian approaches to exploit this fact. Even though the probability is low that such a disaster would take place, the probability is still too high. Don’t get me wrong. Russia would be able to conclude the SMO even without mobilisation. But with a far greater effort from every single soldier and with the risk that through some feint or subterfuge entire  Russian formations could be taken captive. Or as President Putin said, that there are not enough troops available to keep such a large frontline properly manned and equipped.

Well, to fight off the Ukrainian army safely is one reason for mobilisation. Later in this article we will see that Russia will be forced to take, one step at a time, as the Ukrainian army keeps collapsing, all the territory of Ukraine. In the first two Phases this wasn’t necessarily mandatory . In Phase 3 it is necessary. I’ll describe it later in detail. Nevertheless, Russia will need many troops available while it keeps advancing into central and western Ukraine, in order to keep the rear secure and maintain order. As well as maintaining logistics and infrastructure works and taking care of huge camps of POWs. This will be needed when the collapse begins. This is the third reasons for mobilising.

This was the second reason. The third reason is a little unpleasant. Depending on what strategy General Surovikin (I will discuss this in the strategic planning chapter) has chosen, Russia will need far more soldiers than not. If General Surovikin decides to execute head-on deep penetration operations in a front section, that is well defended (somewhat unlikely), then Russia logically sustains huge losses. Not because it has a bad army, but because that’s how warfare works. You can easily calculate losses in such a scenario. This is what every general staff does when planning such operations. And in turn it would mean that these calculations would be passed in advance directly to Moscow to the recruitment offices and the second mobilisation wave would be activated before the offensive starts. Why? Because the estimated losses would occur and the reserves would be needed to be built simultaneously to replenish the losses and fill up in real time the depleted frontline formations. These mobilisations would continue until the war is concluded. Second wave, third wave etc. etc. etc. Essentially what is going on in Ukraine currently.

I personally consider reason three as very unlikely, that’s why I won’t argue further on this. What I want to do is to say that reason one and two combined will materialise. Russia will need to cover a large frontline with enough soldiers. And Russia will advance and with a high velocity in the western direction, as soon as the last material and human reserves of the Ukrainians are depleted. Along the way Russia will need to leave soldiers behind to maintain everything mentioned above. So, I assume that we could see another 2-3 mobilisation waves. Roughly for every 400 miles of territory another mobilisation wave.

What is possible as well is a total collapse or total surrender. In this case it is possible that Ukraine could be “handed over” into a Russian military administration. No more hostilities and mobilisations would be needed. Since we all assume that the West will avoid this scenario and fight literally to the last Ukrainian, I don’t give this, very desirable scenario, a high probability. Even though I assume that this is and always will be President Putin’s favourite outcome, to stop the bloodshed between brothers.

Ukraine War Analysis. Phase 1 & 2

By Aleks (edited by Algora)

Russian Objectives


This article is a direct continuation of the article “The Path to War in Ukraine,” so it makes sense to read the former article first. The goal of this article is to give you an overview of how the war started and what the first actions and results were. Moreover, I want to highlight some high-level procedures of military planning. This article does not intend to go into details, since one could write whole books on that topic. It only aims to give a brief overview.

There is another thing that I want to highlight here. I do not have a military education. Basic training, yes, but that’s all. Given that I have been analysing military conflicts since approx. 2010, having read a lot of military history and being a strategic planner and executive, professionally, I assume that I’m capable of predicting military results based on given facts. If you have any doubt, or if you want to listen to a true and very capable military expert, I recommend listening to Scott Ritter’s interviews and articles or read his book.

Objectives Set by the Russian Leadership

On February 21, 2022, Putin addressed the nation with a set of decisions. I highly recommend to re-listen to his address or read the transcript here. Since it is not my goal to analyse his speech, I will break it, and the decisions that were announced, over the following several days into three main objectives:

  • Denazification:
  • The Soviet Union sacrificed over 26 million people in the second world war, to defeat Nazism. Every family in Russia has some family members that died in that war. It is a big wound in the Russian soul. And the best attack vector against Russia. Unfortunately, Ukraine had huge cells of Nazi collaborators during the world war. [They were] Led by Stepan Bandera. The Western “services” knew about the Russian wound and cultivated followers of Bandera, especially in western Ukraine, even during Soviet times. This trend exploded exponentially since the Western services took control of Ukraine during the events in 2014. Basically, an Anti-Russia was created and armed to the teeth, right on Russia’s border. And not far from Moscow, at that. Especially difficult is the fact that there is a huge Russian-speaking part of the population in Ukraine, which is being discriminated against, if not worse, by the Bandera followers. Russia’s goal is to roll back this development and to remove the whole Nazi and Bandera ideology from Ukraine. Thoroughly, this time, since it wasn’t done properly after WW2. How? I’m not an expert in such questions, so I honestly don’t know what the approach will be. It remains to be seen.
  • Demilitarization:
  • Ukraine, if it remains as a nation state, which I doubt, by the way, would be allowed to have only a small self-defence force. Which implies that its whole military has to be destroyed, or handed over to Russia, beforehand. Moreover, it means that no foreign military, that is hostile to Russia, would be allowed to station its personnel or equipment on Ukrainian soil.
  • Ukraine could have surrendered. In this case it would have handed over its military equipment to Russia. It could have kept what was necessary for basic self-defence as Russia would define it.
  • Absent surrender/negotiation, demilitarization is being implemented by force. This means that all military equipment and troops on Ukrainian soil that are not Russian or allied with Russia, will be destroyed. This includes both Ukrainian and NATO equipment and troops.
  • Since the West is committed to defeating Russia on the battlefield, through Ukrainian proxies, we can assume the following: Russia will demilitarize Ukraine AND the West, as long as the West is committed to sending its equipment and as long as there are Ukrainians still alive who can use that equipment. This would lead to the total demilitarization of both the West and Ukraine, unless the West surrenders (Ukraine) or Russia is defeated on the battlefield.
  • Bringing to justice all Ukrainians who have committed crimes against the Russian-speaking population:
  • Over eight years, Ukraine has committed all kinds of crimes against its Russian-speaking population. There were three main incidents
  • The Ukrainian-held Donbass in general: The Russian-speaking population has suffered different atrocities, which I won’t explain here.
  • In Mariupol, which is part of Donbass, in particular: The most fanatic Nazi formation, called the Azov Regiment, had its headquarters in Mariupol. There are endless reports of atrocities.
  • Odessa: A city founded by the Russian czarina Catherine the Great,  Odessa s considered by most Russians, and as far as I am informed, by the city’s inhabitants as well, to be a Russian city. Nazi formations conducted a massacre there, in 2014, against Russian-speaking inhabitants. Putin specifically mentioned this massacre, and its perpetrators,  in his speech. He said all the perpetrators are known and will be brought to justice.
  • Putin wasn’t aiming at Donbass alone with these goals, but at the whole of Ukraine. This brings us by logical deduction to the conclusion that the whole of Ukraine will need to be captured in order to be able to fulfill the stated goals. There is no other logical way.

Strategic Planning: Basics

First of all, there is no red line that a professional military woold adhere to, no matter what.

Hence, there is no “Russia planned X and didn’t achieve it”.

The only thing that is constant in military planning is the political goal, given by the political leadership of the country. Those objectives are the three mentioned above. The way one sets out to achieve those goals can change, depending on the development of circumstances in the field. Ultimately, the political objectives can change as well, if the military force is too less or too big or the political circumstances change.

If the military force is too weak, then the objectives might be adjusted to more achievable smaller ones — if the political leadership agrees. There are unfortunately examples in human history where such adjustments did not take place. If the military might is strong enough, and the political leadership agrees, then the goals could be expanded.

For the time being, and as is constantly reiterated by Russia’s leadership, all the goals will be achieved and there has been no change.

The military is planning a strategy for how to achieve the political goals. The most crucial thing in military planning is that you have options to cover all potential deviations from the original plan. As many people know, the best plan is only valid until the first bullet starts to fly.

Every military campaign is planned with many options, in case things do not go the way initially planned for. And every campaign can consist of x military operations.

If a country plans its military strategy thoroughly as well as the derived campaigns and operations, and if it takes into consideration the realistic worst-case scenarios, then it will have as a result all the resources and time that will be needed to sustain the project. This means that it is highly likely that Russia had several scenarios of outcomes, including a best case, middle case and worst case. To start this war, Russia would have needed to be prepared for the worst-case scenario. I personally assume that this is the reason that Russia waited for eight years to conduct this Special Military Operation (SMO) — to prepare its economy and military to be able to sustain the worst (realistic) military scenario.

Strategic Planning: Options A, B and C

I will present three scenarios/options that I assume  Russia has planned for in Phase 1.

Again, these are assumptions and of course they can be wrong:

  • Best-case scenario (A):
  • Conducting a massive penetration on a broad frontline to cause a shock and quick collapse of the enemy. In this case Ukraine would have fully surrendered within days or weeks after the invasion. Having analysed the facts, which are available, I assume that it was one of Russia’s realistic goals which were not, in the end,  achieved. The result would have been the handing over of Ukraine to the Russian military.
  • Middle-case scenario (B):
  • Fighting with Ukraine, gradually increasing the intensity, and thereby the Ukrainian military and infrastructural casualties, until Ukraine is ready to negotiate a favorable post war agreement.
  • This was almost achieved at the end of phase 1. Unfortunately, the West intervened and held back Ukraine from concluding a negotiated agreement.
  • In theory such a scenario could still be concluded if Ukraine were a sole actor. However, since it is not Ukrainians who control their own country but foreign powers, the timeframe for scenario B obviously is closed.
  • Worst-case scenario (C):
  • This scenario foresees that Ukraine will not surrender under any circumstances, as long it is physically able to resist. This means that it would fight until the last soldier is killed and the last piece of equipment destroyed, so that the Russian army can drive through to the Polish border. Moreover, it implies that NATO will assist and supply Ukraine with most resources, except those that are “red-lined,” to prevent Ukraine from collapsing too fast. As far as I understand, this is the scenario that is currently being implemented. Of course, everyone involved is hoping that the collapse takes place before too much damage has been done.
  • I have just presented three of what, at least in my opinion or assumptions, are possible scenarios.
  • Scenario A and B would have been possible to achieve within Phase 1. Both scenarios became impossible after Phase 1 was concluded. Now, unfortunately, only scenario C is left. I will go deeper into it, in the articles covering Phase 2 and 3.

Deception and Cover Up

As mentioned above, Russia needed to plan for three scenarios. Considering scenario B and C, we can conclude that Russia would need massive amounts of mobilized and trained troops, properly equipment and hardware, and all the intelligence capacity in place for target acquisition and many more purposes.

We can recall the beginning of phase 1. Very few details, troops and equipment were in place and the troops, except of some staff and general ranked officers, did not have any idea whether it was serious or only a bluff. This means that the troops were not properly prepared and informed for the invasion. We can also recall that 12 hours before the invasion, Russia did alert and started to mobilise its intelligence services. Of course, there are some top-secret parts of the intelligence community, which helped to plan everything. But most parts were not involved and started being mobilised for war intelligence duty just 12 hours in advance.

One could argue that what I just described amounts to poor preparation on the part of the Russian side. This is not the case. My opinion is that the Russian General Staff and the departments of the Russian Intelligence Services that were involved in planning, created a multi-level mixed military-political campaign taking into consideration the three (or however many there are) scenarios mentioned above a well as what escalation steps would be activated, if Ukraine didn’t surrender after this or that event on the battlefield.

The first step was made in total secrecy, to confuse Western intelligence services about the scale and objectives of the first push into Ukraine. If we take into consideration the public communication of the United States days before the invasion, we can understand the deception that was in effect. The Americans were absolutely sure that Russia would invade Ukraine and conquer it within days. Russia could have done that. The Americans know that. That’s why maximum confusion was created .

Only after scenario A failed did Russia activate the next pre-planned steps that led to phase 2, which I will discuss in the next article.

What I simply want to highlight is that all escalatory steps by the Russians are pre-planned and the resources are already allocated. They are only released if needed. That means that, unless Ukraine should surrender, more and more Russian resources will be released, resources that were already earmarked before the invasion for exactly this escalatory step.

The last thing to say is that, as described initially, the Russian troops were not informed about the war and their objectives, to keep everyone in total secrecy. The second the war started, everything was set in motion, to set aside and train the troops allocated for various  purposes that are assigned to them in later escalatory steps. Unfortunately, the Donbass militia took the brunt of the greatest part of the fighting and casualties, especially within Donbass. The reason is to keep Ukrainian troops at bay, grind them down and buy time until the main Russian troops are prepared and trained for their designated purposes.


Depending on the source  you consult, Ukraine did have approx. 300,000 – 500,000 troops at the beginning of the conflict. And the number of troops in Donbass were (also depending on the source), between 100,000 – and 200,000 troops. These were the most experienced and elite troops, assembled for an attack on the militia-held territories in Donbass.

Since the Americans knew for sure that there would be an invasion, they prepared with the Ukrainians, especially with most of their special forces, ambushes and traps on all the roads that would likely be used in the event of an attack. All means of guerrilla warfare were prepared. In this case, we mean high-tech guerrilla warfare, with drones and satellite reconnaissance and communication.

All other regions were thinly defended.

My estimation is that the American services calculated there would be a push on Kiev and on Donbass, and they established the defences accordingly. In Donbass — the regular professional army. In northern Ukraine, Kiev included — with mixed components of the regular army, popular defence and most importantly, almost all the special forces units of Ukraine, training for the mentioned guerrilla warfare.

Russia prepared North and South strike groups, Special Forces (airborne VDV), Donbass militia brigades and Wagner mercenaries. Of course, there were more sub formations, but those were the most important.


As announced before, I don’t intend to go into detail. However, I want to call attention to some highlights.

  1. Russia’s airborne special forces, called VDV, were responsible for pinning down the Ukrainian elite Special Forces troops in and around Kiev. Moreover, to apply maximum pressure on Kiev and the Ukrainian government, to either assist the negotiations or to bring a collapse of the government and achieve a quick total surrender by Ukraine. These troops did the most heroic fighting under the worst possible conditions. They also suffered huge casualties. The formations involved were awarded special decorations by President Putin.
  2. The southern strike group was quite successful. As far as I can judge it, they achieved most, but not all the goals set for the first phase. They captured the whole of Kherson, a huge part of Zaporozhe and fought in the battle for Mariupol. Moreover, they expanded buffer zones around Kherson, Mariupol and Kakhovka. This was in anticipation of future defensive battles, to have space for maneuvering, regrouping and tactical retreats.
  3. The northern group was tasked with pinning down troops across northern Ukraine from Donbass up to Kiev. As far as one can judge the reports (I could be wrong here), these group were not that successful and suffered heavy losses. This could be explained either by bad leadership, or because, as mentioned above, my assumption is, that the Americans expected this would be a main attack vector and accordingly prepared all guerrilla warfare elements in this direction.

There were several purposes, apart from the already mentioned scenarios A, B and C:

  • Ukraine prepared a large-scale attack on the Donbass, which was ready to kick off any time. By attacking on a large front, Russia cut off most of the logistics and reinforcements for the frontline troops in Donbass. A large-scale attack on Donbass was no longer possible. Instead, the Donbass militia utilized the situation and went on the offensive on their own.
  • Creating a permanent land bridge to Crimea. The bridge is good, but in wartime useless. Ukraine maybe isn’t capable, apart from terrorist attacks, of attacking the bridge, but NATO is. It would be one of the first targets that couldn’t be defended.
  • Securing the permanent water supply to Crimea, out of the Kakhovka reservoir.


As initially stated, NATO did prepare Ukraine very well for the likely Russian attack vectors. Several tens of thousands special forces units were trained by NATO in Ukraine and on foreign soil, over eight years, to conduct this kind of guerrilla and stay-behind warfare. Taking this into account, one can understand one of the reasons why Russia has chosen the approach of invading entirely with uniformed soldiers — to avoid having offensive plans trickle through to NATO, and that thereby even more successful ambushes could have been planned.

Having invaded in winter, Russia had even more problems with ambushes. Snow gives good opportunities for preparing ambushes. Especially because columns are forced to drive in an array on roads. Next, I will explain, why this is a problem:

  • Ukraine pre-registered by artillery most of the road sections where Russian columns likely would need to pass. And they did. And many columns have been destroyed. It was a very successful approach. Nevertheless, it was far from enough to hurt the Russians substantially.
  • The Ukrainian military applied the strategy of hiding in civilian buildings on all the roads where the Russian columns had to pass. So, either the Russian shot at civilian houses or they tried to rush through and sustained heavy damage, due to NLAW fire out of windows of civilian buildings. The worst of this approach is that most civilians there are Russian–speaking. This forced the Russian army to shoot at people that they wanted to protect. Rightfully, Amnesty International recognized this approach as a war crime by the Ukrainians.
  • Of course, it absolutely makes sense, to mine the roads where Russians would have been forced to pass. And that’s what Ukrainians did. Many tanks and other vehicles that weren’t equipped properly to detect or remote-detect mines were blown up.
  • A part of the propaganda warfare of Ukraine was to demoralize the Russian public, to trigger it to overthrow President Putin. To achieve that, many ambush kills were filmed by drones and broadcasted immediately. The idea was to make the Russian public demand an end of the war; by refusing it, Putin would lose the confidence of the population and would be eventually overthrown. The broadcasting was very successful. But not the idea that Russians would lose their morale and demand an end of the war. That failed badly.
  • To achieve the exact same goal, to trigger the Russian public to overthrow Putin, Ukraine staged many videos where they tortured captured Russian soldiers horribly. I won’t describe it here in detail. This attempt failed as well. There were no calls for overthrowing Putin. Instead, the Russian public and soldiers got angry and demanded a far more resolute approach against Ukraine. Soldiers didn’t surrender that quickly. Instead, many fought to the death, because they knew what awaited them.


I described the main strike directions of the first phase. As mentioned in the possible scenarios, those strikes were intended to achieve scenario A or B. Unfortunately, A was never an option. Ukrainians were remote controlled, down to the unit level. There was never the possibility that orders could be issued from a central command to the various units, to surrender. This still applies today.

Nevertheless, there were some pre-negotiations during phase 1 in Minsk. They led to a meeting on March 29, 2022, in Istanbul. These negotiations officially had the potential to end the conflict. Ukrainian neutrality should be declared and the recognition of Donbass and Crimea as Russian. The parties were close to a conclusion. In the following days, the proposals should have been discussed in the capitols and then an agreement should have been reached at the top level. As a sign of goodwill, Russia withdrew all troops from northern Ukraine, including Kiev.

Unfortunately, the West had other plans for Ukraine. Boris Johnson flew immediately to Kiev and after a meeting between him and Zelensky, Ukraine completely withdrew from negotiations.

This event triggered the activation and announcement of phase 2 by the Russian leadership at the end of March 2022.

Further thoughts

  • Russia decided to apply a special military operation in Ukraine. Not a doctrinal war. The big question is, why? Many people, including Western intelligence services, thought there would be a doctrinal push. It would have many advantages, but some disadvantages as well. This is a topic for another article. But I will go a little bit into it here. By applying a special military operation, Russia had the following opportunities:
    • Proceeding slowly (if we exclude phase 1), so the West has all time it needs to deplete itself militarily and economically. Thus, Russia would be able to force the West down on its knees and implement the new draft security framework for Europe, without getting into an actual military conflict with NATO.
    • Drawing all Ukrainian troops and (NATO) equipment out of the big cities and western regions, and to destroy it in a place with short supply lines, a friendly population and total air domination. This is the Donbass and Kherson. Thereby a collapse of Ukraine can be triggered, slowly but surely, without the need to fight devastating battles in Ukraine’s large cities.  Thereby further scenarios like Mariupol are avoided.
  • I want to emphasize that I’m by 100% convinced that the Russian leadership calculated and still is calculating with confidence, on a full Ukrainian surrender. And the handing over of Ukraine as a whole by its military to Russia’s military. This is what eventually will happen. Unfortunately, we can assume that many people still will have to die before this happens. I wrote that I think that this was planned from the beginning. This is to be explained by what I wrote in the “Strategic planning” section of this article. Russia is following a predefined but flexible escalation process:
    • It was clear from the beginning that Ukraine as a whole needs to be captured, to reach all the geopolitical and security goals set by the political leadership of Russia. Nevertheless, Russia needs always to show the whole world, and first and foremost its BRICS allies, that it is always ready to negotiate. Even though all parties are fully clear that this is an existential war between the West and Russia. The party that loses vanishes into geopolitical insignificance. There will be either a strong Russia with BRICS afterwards and NO West (geopolitically) or there will be the West, and the BRICS project would be over. Therefore, all parties involved will always find a reason not to negotiate or why negotiations failed. As many say, “until the last Ukrainian.” I personally think that Russia proceeds carefully and will execute a quick final blow, when the time comes that suits Russia, to preserve as many Ukrainians and their infrastructure as possible. Why? Because it will inherit it and will need to either incorporate it and rebuild it or find another solution.
    • Why was I sure, from the beginning, that the whole of Ukraine is on the plate? Because the leaders of Hungary and Serbia started to be very bold in their communication with the West. They did and said things that would have been a no-go before. Things for which they would be sanctioned into oblivion. Hungary, for example, blocked many EU sanctions against Russia. This is huge. This tells me that Hungary and Serbia had information in advance as to what the Russian plans are and how the future landscape between Russia, Hungary and Serbia will look: without Ukraine. Since I believe that there will be a land-bridge between Russia (with the whole of Ukraine as federal subject) and Hungary, I think that  finally military ground and air support will be possible, as well as trade by land and the Black Sea. So, Hungary and Serbia are no longer afraid of a military attack by NATO and by Western sanctions, that will be obsolete after the implementation of the multipolar world order. I have further thoughts about this, which I will explain in detail in another article.

Results of phase 1

Here I want to give a quick overview of the achieved objectives of phase 1:

  • Denazification was not completed yet.
  • Demilitarization was not completed yet.
  • Bringing war criminals to justice was not completed yet.
  • Huge territorial gains were made, and deep buffer zones around big cities were created for maneuvering in defence. Both sides suffered huge casualties, which are normal under such circumstances.

Part 2


This article is a continuation of the article about Phase 1. Therefore, I highly recommend to first read the first article, before continuing here. Here is the link.

The second phase of this war still was carried out as a special military operation. Nevertheless, one step higher on the escalation ladder. The second phase still was carried out in an offensive way. Many strategic villages and towns were captured by the Russians. Buffer zones were expanded around strategic spots.

Phase 2 has been conducted, roughly, between April and July 2022. Officially Phase 2 never was concluded. That’s why the conclusion of Phase 2 at the end of July 2022 is according to my own definition.

The qualities of Russian officers were tested and some passed the test and others didn’t. Which reminds me of the Winter War between the Soviets and Finland. Moreover, first problems with the contracts of the Russian soldiers occurred, that were direct consequences of secretive planning.

The most interesting event, apart from the capturing of important cities, of phase 2, were the occurrence of HIMARS in Ukraine.

Most of the able-bodied men of Ukraine, that didn’t flee, were mobilized and underwent training abroad. Most of these men haven’t been committed to the fight during phase 2.

Last but not least, one major Russian political objective was achieved.

I will NOT cover the economic aspects of the war here. For economics look at my separate article here.

Well, this was a short introduction to my article. Now we will go into the details.


Russian Objectives

Russia still followed the same objectives as in Phase 1. Nevertheless, now without the possibility of a shock and awe victory. It was now absolutely clear, that Russia will need to defeat the Ukrainian army, to be able to implement the stated objectives. I will reiterate the most important:

  • Denazification of Ukraine
  • Demilitarization of Ukraine
  • Bring to justice those Ukrainians, that have committed (war)crimes against its own population from 2014 onwards
  • Free the Donbass to ensure its independence and security

Of course, Russia had a sufficient force assembled at this time, to achieve all of this goals. But what does that mean exactly? I will deepen this later in another chapter (deception), but we need to consider the following:

  • Russia planned through the whole ladder of escalations and prepared and provided (even today and going forward) exactly the resources on the battlefield, that are needed for the current configuration of the battlefield and the enemy.
  • Russia was planning to fight the UKAINIAN army and has been provided forces accordingly.
  • Ukrainians are Russian brothers and relatives. In Phase 2, Russia still planned to destroy only the Ukrainian army. Not civilians and not civilian infrastructure. If the army falls, the rest of the country would fall quickly as a whole.
  • Conclusion: Russia had provided enough troops, resources and equipment to Phase 2, to destroy the Ukrainian troops and the UKRANINIAN equipment. I will deepen this later.

Ukrainian Objectives

Since Ukraine absorbed the first shock without collapsing, it started to plan with its allies (Western countries) how it can win the war. Now we need to remember. To win a war doesn’t mean to defeat the enemy army on the battlefield. That is an impossible task for Ukraine. To win a war means, to achieve its political objectives.

We need to consider, that “Ukraine” as a state didn’t have any objectives, since it lost the whole of its control and independence to US/UK services in 2014. That’s why it is a little hard, to write about Ukrainian objectives here. I will rather refer to Western objectives IN Ukraine:

  • Keeping as much territory under control near big Russian cities, to keep a leverage over Russia. Which included the Donbass, Kharkov, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Kiev.
  • Inflicting such heavy casualties on the Russian military, to influence the political situation in Russia.
  • Collecting as much intelligence over Russian tactics and strategies, as well as military equipment as possible.
  • Test as much own (NATO) tactics, strategies and military equipment under real conditions as possible to improve them.
  • Activate Europe as much as possible to sever all ties with Russia.
  • Not losing an inch of territory, to keep the Western public activated to keep on suffering (economically) to support Ukraine further on.
  • Concealing all own casualties, to keep its own population motivated. Moreover, the Westerners activated. The Western population would have struggled more, to support the war, when they would have known, for how many deaths they are responsible, by supporting and prolonging the war.
  • Collapsing Russia and especially activating the Russian population to stage a coup against Putin.

One might think that these objectives are totally unrealistic. But there were not. More about that in the next chapters.

Will 2023 be a “Tsunami of Regret”?

Excerpts from Brian Shilhavy of Health Impact News

[ . . .] Dr. Jane Ruby’s interview with Dr. Sherri Tenpenny is spread out over 3 videos on her Rumble channel. I have combined them into one video and abridged them down to under 25 minutes.

Dr. Sherri Tenpenny is not new to this topic, and so I highly recommend watching this video as they summarize where we are today with the COVID-19 shots, and what is likely coming in the future as we head into 2023. These two doctors are not looking to score political points or win popularity contests, as far as I can see, and are far more concerned with providing truth to educate the public.

This is on our Bitchute channel, and will also be on our Odysee and Telegram channels.

WHO Labels Unvaccinated a “Major Killing Force”

Last Wednesday, the World Health Organisation (“WHO”) labelled unvaccinated people a “major killing force globally.” WHO is promoting a new video that targets “anti-vaccine activism” by blasting those who choose not to be vaccinated for supporting “anti-science aggression.”

The WHO has made this wholesale condemnation of “anti-vaccine activists” despite the emerging risks of the experimental mRNA shots. However, the WHO’s showcased physician, paediatrician and vaccine advocate Peter Hotez, did not acknowledge these facts in his rant.

Read more HERE and HERE

What Did They Know and When Did They Know It?

The day before WHO tweeted out its video, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis held an accountability roundtable. He announced his plans to petition the state’s Supreme Court to convene a grand jury to investigate “any and all wrongdoing” with respect to the Covid “vaccines.” The goal, said DeSantis, would be to gather more information from pharmaceutical companies about the vaccines and their potential side effects.

Read more HERE.

Covid Accountability Moves Closer

A coroner in the UK has ruled that the death of a fit and healthy 27-year-old was caused by a blood clot as a direct result of the AstraZeneca jab.

In the US the GOP members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have released a report that indicates that SARS-CoV-2 may have been a Chinese bioweapon.

A Conservative Member of Parliament in the UK denounced the approval of these injections for infants as, “not safe, not effective, and not necessary.”

Unfortunately for those still pushing the psyop, people worldwide are waking up and realising that the “cure” has been more deadly than the disease.

Read more HERE.

The Twitter Files

Shadowbanning,” “visibility filtering,” “de-amplification” – the Twitter Files released since Elon Musk took over have given us a new and sinister language of digital censorship. For example, users were systematically de-amplified, shadowbanned and banned essentially because they are fierce opponents of doctrines like “white privilege” and “critical race theory,” and were opposed to Covid lockdowns and vaccine mandates.

The first details of the Twitter Files were released on 2 December. Twitter’s former leadership curtailed public debate; drew arbitrary lines about what’s fake and what’s real.  Musk says he won’t do that. 

Read more HERE and HERE.

So far, the details being published relate to Hunter Biden’s laptop and US politics.  But who knows what else they may reveal.  Are Covidians fearful of what secrets may not remain hidden?

via Exposé News