By Valentin Vasilescu
Translated by Alice Decker
Originally posted at Algora Blog.

From 8 November 2016 to 6 January 2017, Russia tested in the Eastern Mediterranean a naval group’s ability to execute complex missions similar to those missions that anti-assault craft would have to perform in the event of a NATO invasion targeting the coasts of Russia. The Russian naval group was composed of the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, the nuclear-powered cruiser Peter the Great, the destroyers Severomorsk and Vice Admiral Kulakov, and the frigate Admiral Grigorovich. The Russian aircraft carrier, with a displacement of 60,000 t., had onboard fourteen Su-33 multi-purpose aircraft, four Mig-29Ks (of the twenty Mig-29K/KUB which it could carry), four Su-25UTG/UBP training/ground attack aircraft, and fourteen Kamov Ka-27PLO anti-submarine helicopters.

The Russian aircraft aboard the Admiral Kuznetsov executed 420 missions, hitting 1,252 Syrian terrorist targets. Each plane onboard was armed with Kh-29 type L/T air–ground missiles and T Kh-25 (guided by laser or TV camera), launched from an altitude of 10,000 meters and at a distance of 10–12 km from the targets. The aircraft carrier supplemented the two Russian light bomber squadrons that remained behind to operate out of the Hmeymim airbase in Syria after the attempt to establish a ceasefire in Syria (February 27, 2016) and which can launch 72 “smart” guided bombs or missiles  daily.

The US nuclear propulsion aircraft carriers have on board 85 to 90 aircraft (of which 50 are F/A-18/EA-18Gs) and are provided with CATOBAR systems (Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery), which makes it possible to accelerate the take-off of aircraft having a mass of more than 40 t., including E-2D Hawkeye AEW aircraft (airborne early warning). The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov can take on board only 36 aircraft, and it is equipped with STOBAR (short take-off but arrested recovery) and a ski-jump ramp that does not allow the use of AEW aircraft. STOBAR limits the take-off mass of the aircraft and, therefore, they cannot take off with externally mounted extra fuel tanks. For this reason, jets flying from the American carriers have an operational range of 700 km, while those from the Russian carrier have a flight radius of only 300 km. This detail was not a problem since the distance between the Islamist targets in the governorate of Idlib or Aleppo and the position of the Russian naval group was about 150–200km.

Therefore, the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier is especially useful in the defense of Russia, as it can intercept enemy bombers or fighter-bombers operating beyond the tactical range of Russian aircraft stationed on land. It is also useful in forcing aircraft onboard a NATO naval group to engage battle before the Russian coastline comes into range. In the second case, the planes are armed with Kh-61 missiles (airborne version of the P-800 Onyx), with a range of 350–500 km and a flight speed of Mach 2.5 (2,800 km/h).

The Russian naval group was not limited to bombing Islamist rebels; it also tested counter-attack capabilities by launching real ship-to-ship missiles on board. The Admiral Kuznetsov is also armed with other defensive weapons, such as P-700 Granit ship-to-ship missiles, with a radius of 625 km, flying at Mach 1.6–2.5. The cruiser Peter the Great is also armed with P-700 Granit missiles, while the Severomorsk and Vice Admiral Kulakov destroyers have the P-270 Moskit missile with a range of 250 km. The frigate Admiral Grigorovich is armed with 3M14T Kalibr cruise missiles with range of 2500 km and P-800 Onix missiles.

Starting in October 2015, when Russia deployed an air-and-ground contingent in Syria, the Russian naval forces conducted several rounds of combat exercises aimed at Islamist terrorist targets. Through these exercises, Russia has actually tested the new capabilities that they would use in a defensive operation against NATO. On November 15, 2016, the K-300P Bastion coastal missile system — installed by the Russians on the Syrian coast — launched 24 rockets against terrorist Islamist bunkers in Syria. The K-300P is a coastal anti-ship missile, of the “sea-skimming” type, derived from the P-800 Onyx. On November 17, 2015, over sixteen 3M-14T Kaliber cruise missiles were launched from the diesel-electric submarine Rostov-on-Don, located in the Mediterranean Sea. Another twenty-six 3M-14T Kaliber cruise missiles were launched from a Gepard-class frigate and the two Buyan-class corvettes, all located in the Caspian Sea. Also on November 17, 2015, Russia launched thirty-four KH-555 cruise missiles at terrorist targets in Syria, using Tu-22M3, Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers that took off from the Engels air base in the Volga region, using the same battle technique as the Russian naval air forces.

From the doctrinal point of view, the US Navy supports the military invasion of distant lands, using naval expeditionary forces. This characteristic is based on the fact that they have a large number of modern ocean-going vessels. The US Navy fleet is composed of 10–11 aircraft carriers, 21 helicopter carriers (9 amphibious assault ships, 2 amphibious command ships and 10 amphibious transport docks), 22 cruisers, 63 destroyers, 8 LCS ships (Littoral combat ships), 51 nuclear-powered attack submarines, and 14 nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles.

Since 2013 the U.S. Navy has received three ESD (Expeditionary Shuttle Docks) mobile amphibious platforms: the Montford Point (T-MLP-1), the John Glenn (T-MLP-2) and the Lewis b. Puller (T-MLP-3), with a displacement of 34,000–84,000 t. Only the US has this type of vessels, specially designed to transport armored vehicles and heavy fighting equipment close to the shore. Since the deck is accessible at water level, Marines and combat equipment can be transferred by helicopters  and large hovercraft, which deposit them to dry land. The U.S. Army has depots on every continent, and in countries close to areas of potential military conflict. For example, in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has huge depots that keep military equipment the U.S. Army for operations in any State from Asia and East Africa. Here are stored thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, logistical equipment, helicopters and ammunition that could make up two American army corps. ESD amphibious mobile platforms allow the timely transport, positioning, and concentration of maritime assault forces in any theater of action around the globe. They also serve as a base for naval Special Operations missions, along with an amphibious command ship (helicopter carrier).

Unlike the U.S. Navy, most Russian naval and naval aviation missions have to do with defending the Russian coast, from enemies far away and on distant fronts. Maintaining Russia’s strategic nuclear strike capacity is an exception; for this, they have a fleet of 38 atomic-powered submarines, most carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles (including three new Borey-class submarines and one Yasen-class). With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the shipyards on the Black Sea reverted to Ukraine. The most important of those was the shipyard at Mykolaiv, where Soviet aircraft carriers were built, along with helicopter carriers, cruisers and destroyers. However, the four sites for the construction of conventional and nuclear-powered submarines and their supply chain remained wholly within the territory of the Russian Federation. Although it has a very competent design team, Russia has stopped building aircraft, helicopter carriers, cruisers and destroyers since their naval gas turbines have all been designed and manufactured since the Soviet era in Ukraine’s Zorya plant in Mykolaiv. Ukraine stopped delivering any military equipment to Russia in 2014. Russian aviation engine manufacturer NPO Saturn tries to fill the gap by replacing Ukrainian engines with its own, but only for the new Russian frigates Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Grigorovich, not for larger ships. At the same time, Western electronic and navigation systems are no longer available because of the sanctions imposed on Russia.

Russia retired many of its large Soviet-era ships in the last ten years, maintaining in service one aircraft carrier (the Admiral Kuznetsov), one nuclear-powered cruiser (the Pyotr Velikiy), three conventional cruisers (the Moskva, the Marshal Ustinov, the Varyag) and 15 destroyers. Retrofitting the large surface ships in this case entails replacing the old delivery systems and missiles by installing in the deck ten to twelve 3S-14, 3M-54, 3M22 or 3M55 vertical launch systems, each having eight launch cells, just like the MK41 on the American AEGIS destroyers and cruisers. The launch cells are compatible with 3M-14T Kalibr cruise missiles, similar to the RGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk on US ships, P-800 Onyx ship-to-ship rockets, and the Kh-41 Moskit, naval variants of ship-to-air missiles like the S-400 (range: 400 km) or the S-350, etc.

Russia has placed a particular emphasis on increasing the number of conventional attack submarines, which number 24 (of which six are new Varshavyanka class submarines). The Varshavyanka class submarine has hydro-acoustic technology and advanced electronics that make it the quietest submarine class in the world, and it is also extremely maneuverable in the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Russian attack submarines are equipped with 3M-14T Kalibr cruise missiles and Kh-41 Moskit anti-ship missiles, with 250 km range and Mach 3.2 (3587 km/h).

Extremely useful for the new missions of the Russian Navy near the coast are fast, smaller, multi-purpose ships like the six frigates (two of which are of the new Admiral Grigorovich class) and 81 missile corvettes (of which two are Gepard class, eight are Buyan class, and four are Steregushchiy, all new). The new vessels have 3S-14 vertical launch systems, and the oldest ones are in the process of being upgraded to the same standard. The standard version has 3M-14T Kalibr cruise missiles, and P-800 and Kh-41 Moskit Onix ship-to-ship missiles. Their air defense systems are made up of ship-to-air Buk M3s (with a range of 70 km) or Pantsir-M (range: 24 km).

After the war in Georgia in 2008, when Russia was slow to respond due to the lack of high capacity amphibious transport ships, the Russian Navy wanted to get four amphibious assault ships (helicopter carriers). Unlike aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships have on board not only two to three squadrons of helicopters (or vertical take-off and landing aircraft) but a land contingent (a battalion of marines with all combat equipment) and the means for landing them on the coast (including ships and hovercraft). In 2014, Paris refused to deliver the two Mistral helicopter carriers that Russia had already paid for, citing Moscow’s involvement in the crisis in Ukraine. Subsequently, the two Mistral helicopter carriers were sold to Egypt. The Mistral has a displacement of 21,300 t., and can take on board sixteen Ka-52K attack helicopters and sixteen ASW (anti-submarine warfare) transport and reconnaissance helicopters.

Outside of France, there are only a few countries that can afford helicopter carriers. The US has eight Wasp-class helicopter carriers and one America-class, at 41,000 t., with twelve CH-46 Sea Knight transport helicopters, six AV-8B type vertical-takeoff-and-landing or mobile rotor planes (MV-22 Osprey), four AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, and nine anti-submarine and search & rescue Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions. England boasts three Ocean and Albion Class helicopter carriers (21,000 and 23,700 t.), built in their own shipyards, with eighteen helicopters each. Italy has three San Giorgio class ships with American helicopters equipped with SH-3D Sea King helicopters, South Korea has built a 18,000 t. Dokdo-class helicopter carrier with 15 American Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters on board. Japan has an Izumo-class helicopter carrier (27,000 t.) and two Hyuga-class (19,000 t.) that can carry American SH-60K and MH-53E Super Stallion helicopters. Australia has ordered from Spain’s Navantia shipyards two amphibious command ships (helicopter carriers) Juan Carlos class (27,000 t.): the Canberra and the Adelaide. These two have on board the American S-70B Seahawk multi-role helicopter. Spain also has a Juan Carlos class ship (with eleven AV8B vertical takeoff aircraft and twelve NH90 helicopters) and one Galicia class (13,815 t.) with six NH-90 helicopters. China has three Type 071 vessels for amphibious troops (20,000 t.), with Z-8 helicopters on board built under license after the French Super Frelon.

By Valentin Vasilescu
Translated by Alice Decker

Originally posted at Algora Blog.

By January 10, 2017, Russia had deployed more Su-25 SM3 fighter bombers in Syria and withdrawn four Su-24 Ms. This is a signal that Russia is changing tactics in combating Islamist terrorism. The Su-25 has been modernized in multiple stages, resulting in the models Su-25 SM/SM2/SM3, with the latest modernization taking place beginning in 2013. The Russian Air Force has about 150 of the upgraded Su-25 aircraft (SM3/UBM2), along with another 120 non-upgraded Su-25s. The aircraft is powered by two RD-195 engines, with a thrust of 4,500 kgf, and has a maximum speed of 975 km/h.

Interestingly, at the time they attempted to impose a ceasefire in Syria, on February 27, 2016, Russia withdrew from Syria almost all the fifteen Su-25SM3s. As the fighter jets were over 20 years old and had each had over 200 flying hours in Syria, they were sent to Russian aviation repair shops for inspection. This is a part of  testing military equipment and train the Russian military under field conditions, with a view to defending against a NATO invasion of Russia [1].

What is the nature of Russia’s change in tactics in fighting Islamișt terrorists in Syria? Until now, Russia has attacked targets in Syria using cruise missiles launched from submarines, surface warships and long-range bombers. On the other hand, the Russian tactical bombers that operated from the Hmeymim base in Syria executed missions that were planned in advance, after unmanned reconnaissance located targets hours or days earlier. As a rule, these targets were not very mobile and were at a safe distance from civilians and the Syrian army troops. The Russian aircraft were armed with just two bombs or air-to-ground rockets, laser-beam guided by GPS and TV/IR, with the bombings executed from altitudes of 8,000–10,000m.

Russia’s change of tactics in Syria means that Russian aircraft will be tasked almost exclusively with close support missions (CAS — close air support) in order to create breaches in the Islamist rebels’ defense that will permit the swift advance of Syrian troops. Now, the Su-25 SM3 is the best suited aircraft for such missions. Most close support missions will be carried out at night, without timely, detailed information from unmanned reconnaissance drones, and will consist of lengthy patrols at high altitudes in areas located over territory held by Islamists rebels, using the “target hunting” approach. Once a target is identified, the pilot initiates the procedure for attacking it.

However, close support missions require perfect coordination in time and space with the military on the ground, which entails the use of Russian officers specializing in routing Su-25 MTS aircraft and firsthand target identification from the ground up. First, they identify the position of the pilots carrying out close support, by radio and, what is obligatory at night, by an invisible laser beam device that is detected by optical sensors onboard the Russian aircraft. Then the flight controller/targeting officer [NATO: Forward Air Controller; US: Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC)] uses the same instrument to mark with a laser beam the target that is to be hit. This provides the maximum accuracy in hitting moving targets like Toyota trucks armed with machine guns or sniper teams and rebel support bases located in the lower floors of buildings.

The electro-optical SOLT-25 system (with laser, TV and IR sensors) mounted in the nose supports the FLIR [forward-looking infrared] and the GLONASS navigation systems, for seeking and identifying targets from high altitudes for night strikes. For attacking targets, the Su-25 SM3 has the PrNK-25SM Bars navigation/attack suite for central fire control, using the SOLT-25 electro-optical system and a rangefinder with a laser marking instrument to direct precision weaponry. In the process of “target hunting,” guided bombs or small arms are rarely used, with unguided rockets and onboard cannon most often preferred. The SM3 Su-25 has a double-barreled GSh-30-2 type rotary cannon, 30 mm caliber firing at a rate of 2000 rounds/minute, using incendiary/armor piercing projectiles, incendiary/explosives and AP-T projectiles (Armour-Piercing Tracers) with a tungsten core.

The Su-25 SM3 has ten mounting points in the wings and fuselage which can take extra tanks and guns weighing 4340 kg. When “target hunting,” the Su-25 SM3 is equipped with eight to ten UB-32/57 blocks, each armed with thirty-two S-5M/K reactive projectiles (57mm caliber), or B-8M1, B-13L, PU-O-25 rocket pods, armed with rockets of 80mm, 122mm and 266mm caliber. An attack consists of launching a salvo of cannon projectiles or reactive projectiles at a dive angle of 15–30 degrees, from heights of 1000–3000m. The “target hunting” approach makes it possible to execute several attacks on different targets.

However, while they are much more effective than bombing runs planned in advance, close air support missions are extremely risky, as below the altitude of 5,000m all aircraft are vulnerable to MANPADS, and below 3,000m they are vulnerable to heavy machine guns and to 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 23mm and 30mm caliber cannons, which are in the possession of the Islamist rebels. The Russian Su-25 fighter jet is the equivalent of the American A-10, both having titanium armor weighing in at 500 kg, with a thickness of 15–30mm, which resists 23mm-caliber projectiles and carbon fiber projectiles (which produces fragmentation).

To protect against surface-to-air missiles, the Su-25 SM3 is equipped with the Vitebsk-25 system, similar to the Spectra ESM one seen on the French Rafale fighters. It locks in on the aircraft based on the enemy radar, calculates its azimuth and the type of aircraft, and after that jams the signals on many frequencies, using the L-370-3S integrated system. The Vitebsk-25 also protects the Sukhoi-25 SM3 against IR- and laser-guided missiles, including ground-to-air missiles (MANPADs), using the APP-50 passive jamming subsystem that generates infrared decoy flares.

*

[1]. HOW COULD THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA END IN 2017? (https://southfront.org/how-could-the-conflict-in-syria-end-in-2017/).

[2]. Who Forced Russia to Intervene in Syria? (https://www.algora.com/Algora_blog/?p=163).

by Valentin Vasilescu

Translated by Alice Decker

Attempting to deduce the reasons behind Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Syria, we run into a number of unknowns. First, why were Russian planes in Syria that could have been equipped with 8–24 missiles or bombs furnished with only two bombs or missiles, all of them “smart” (KAB-250 S/LG, KAB-500 L/Kr, KAB-KAB-1500 L, 1500 K, Kh-29 L/T, Kh-25 T), guided by laser beam, GPS and TV/IR? These weapons are accurate to within 2–5 m. It is also unknown why the Russian fighter-bombers were sometimes kept in the air for an hour until the last Syrian civilian was removed from the target area. Don’t forget that the American B-52 bombers carpet bombed Vietnam, burying combatants along with the inhabited localities around them, and the US A-1 Skyrider, F-100, F-105, F-4, F-8, a-4, a-6, a-26 and B-57 planes dumped thousands of loads of napalm on Vietnamese villages. The procedure used by the Russians in Syria is one that is only used by an air force defending its own territory.

It’s also unclear why Russia decided to intervene only in October 2015, almost four years after the war began in Syria, when 75% of the territory of the nation had been occupied by Islamist rebels. In February 2014, the coup d’état took place in Ukraine, supported by the West and dubbed “Euromaidan,” followed by Crimea’s accession to Russia by referendum in March 2014 and the outbreak of the civil war in eastern Ukraine. The US, the EU and nations loyal to the United States instituted an economic embargo against Russia. In September 2014, during the summit in Wales, NATO decided to develop new defensive capabilities on the border with Russia. This took the form of relocating Brigade 3 tanks from the American 4th Division, to the Baltic countries and Poland (87 Abrams M1A1 tanks, 20 self-propelled M109A6 Paladin howitzers, and 136 M2 Bradley infantry fighting machines). To this is added the 10^th Aviation Brigade (50 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, 10 heavy transport CH-47 Chinook helicopters and 24 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters).

In the Gulf War, the Americans formulated a new seek-and-destroy algorithm to penetrate into the strategic depth of the enemy’s defenses. After American aviation secured aerial superiority, American fighter-bombers shifted to neutralizing, with high precision, Iraqi armored vehicles along the fortified lines for counterattack and the armored vehicles along the counteroffensive lines, using the second tier and the reserve of large tactical-operative units. Simultaneously with this, the attack helicopters of the American Army and Marine Corps succeeded, together with the batteries of 155mm caliber Paladin M109A6 self-propelled howitzers, in neutralizing brigade artillery groups, divisions, and formations of the first echelon of the Iraqi army.

The precise location of Iraqi targets was obtained via the American Army’s complex reconnaissance program based on — in addition to satellite data — four levels of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance), collecting and processing data in order to formulate a complete picture of the theater of operations on the ground. The first, strategic, level consisted of the RQ-4 A/B Global Hawk long-range unmanned surveillance aircraft and later the RQ-170 Sentinel, as well as the U-2, E-8C, and RC manned surveillance planes. The second level of ISR was represented by the RQ-7 Shadow, RQ-5 Hunter, MQ-1 Predator, and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned medium- and short-range surveillance planes. The third level of ISR consisted of manned prop planes, like the Cessna Caravan 208B, C-23A Sherpa, C-12R Horned Owl and the C-12 MARSS-II King Air. The fourth level was made up of a fleet of helicopters from the 12 aviation brigades of the US Army (OH-58D Kiowa Warriors and AH-64 Apaches).

Through the combined action of the American seek-and-destroy             systems, the Iraqi combat structure was disrupted, creating large corridors permitting the penetration of mechanized or tanks units. To pierce deep within the defenses and surround the flanks, they used not so much the M1A2 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, or AAV-7A1 marine infantry fighting vehicle — all slow-moving tracked vehicles — but rather gave preference to LAV-25 Stryker motorized units equipped with armored personnel carriers (which can reach a speed of 100km on the highway) made up into Stryker brigades.

The model Stryker Brigade has 135 Stryker armored personnel carriers and three infantry battalions (3 companies), a reconnaissance squadron (3 companies) with 33 Stryker armored personnel carriers and 12 HMMWV, an artillery division (3 batteries of towed howitzers, 155 mm caliber) and a battalion of special operations troops. Starting in 2012, the Russian army converted 7–10 motorized brigades in accordance with the American Stryker model, based on BTR-80 and BTR-82A amphibious armored personnel carriers. Over the next 2–3 years, the BTR-80/82A will be replaced with new the VPK-7829 Boomerang.

In Syria, the Russian Su-25, Su-24, and Su-34 fighter-bombers and those of the Syrian air force created breaches in the rebel battle formations, striking their ammunition and fuel reserves and mobile combat equipment (such as tanks and towable artillery pieces), and also their armored fortifications. Russian Mi-24V and Mi-28N attack helicopters eliminated from the rebels’ defense arsenal Toyota pick-up trucks armed with machine guns, rocket launchers and portable anti-tank rockets (from the counter-offensive arrays) and vehicles loaded with explosives for suicide attacks. Through these breaches they brought in Russian BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, considered to be highly advanced given their great maneuverability in unobstructed terrain, and their fire power from turret-mounted 30mm cannons. For their protection, along with the BTR-82As there were some Russian T-90A tanks equipped with the Shtora active defense system which renders useless the American TOW-2 anti-tank missiles. And it can’t be ruled out that Russia will also send Syria its new types of armored vehicles (the T-14 Armata tank, the T-15 and Kurganets-25 IFVS), which are in the test phase now — the most advanced tanks as of today.

In Syria, the Russian army has created a strong component of C4I reconnaissance (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability) for its search-and-strike system. The collection and processing of data has been stratified on many levels, just as it is in the US Army. These levels comprise, in addition to satellite data, Il-20M1 and Tu-214R manned reconnaissance planes (which can carry out missions lasting 12 hours or more), Zala, Yakovlev Pchela-1T and Orlan-10 short-range unmanned planes (UAVs), Dozor 600 long-range unmanned flights, and also Mi-35 and Ka-52 reconnaissance and attack helicopters.

Since the anti-Islamic State coalition led by the US (which includes NATO and the Arab Gulf States) had aircraft operating in the airspace of northern, central and eastern Syria, according to statements by General Philip Breedlove, the former NATO commander in Europe, the Russian air and land forces created an exclusion zone (A2 / AD bubble) in western Syria, barring NATO forces. Within the exclusion zone, Russia implemented a set of security measures by which it secured primacy in the radio-electronic war (Electronic warfare – EW) against the land, air and space reconnaissance systems of the anti-Islamic State coalition.

The area became opaque to the Coalition’s reconnaissance due to the Russian Krasukha-4 equipment, which jams radar surveillance from American spy satellites of the Lacrosse / Onyx families, ground based radars, AWACS and other airborne radar systems like the E-8C, RC135, Sentinel R1, and those mounted on unmanned planes such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, and the MQ-9 Reaper. The Russian planes were equipped with SAP-518/ SPS-171 and L-175B Hibini jamming pods, while the Mi-8AMTSh helicopters were outfitted with Richag-AV jamming systems. Other jamming equipment that Russia has sent to Syria can disrupt and cancel flight commands, from a distance, to drones executing reconnaissance in the airspace of western Syria, or it can generate countermeasures, in the visible spectrum, infrared or laser, against the Americans’ electro-optical aerial or cosmic surveillance (imagery intelligence, IMINT). Inside the zone of exclusion in Syria, Russia has also deployed Su-30 SM and Su-35 intercept jets along with S-400 long range anti-aircraft missiles.

Thus, the deployment of the Russian air and land forces in Syria was also a consequence of the Obama Administration’s measures with regard to Russia, especially the increased NATO aggression close to Russia’s borders. It has not only served to support Bashar Al Assad’s regime but has spurred Russia’s military preparation with a view to repelling the eventual NATO invasion of Russia desired by the Obama Administration. But it also served to test certain essential components of the new strategic search and strike system of the Russian army. This system had not been tested until now, under field conditions, in combat. The system that was copied from the American one has been adapted to the specific needs of the Russian army, and that is to defend Russia in the event of a NATO invasion.