by Gilbert Doctorow
My unfinished sentence about the Russian aircraft now on permanent patrol of the Black Sea and carrying Russia’s hypersonic Kinzhal missiles would have ended in the following: the Russian missiles can strike the U.S. aircraft carrier task force off Israeli shores and two of them are sufficient to send the Gerald Ford to the bottom of the sea.
That last point is not my own interpretation: it was stated clearly on a live broadcast of Russia’s premier talk show hosted by Vladimir Solovyov two days ago. To that I add here a very important additional note that highlights how close we are coming to the war to end all wars: Putin made his statement about the Kinzhals not from his Kremlin offices but from the guest house in Beijing where he spent two days this week and met for several hours with Chinese president Xi Jinping. As a veteran Kremlinologist, I can say with confidence that Putin’s readiness to finish off the American aircraft carrier task force in the Mediterranean if necessary had been discussed with and approved by Xi, who surely has his own concerns about the U.S. navy operating most provocatively in the South China Sea. It also aligns with the threat by North Korean leader Kim one week ago that he is ready to sink the U.S. aircraft carrier that loiters in the vicinity of the Korean peninsula. What we have before us is the prospect of Pearl Harbor all over again, but in three seas.
These separate facts are in the public domain. I remain surprised that no one is drawing the dots to the obvious conclusion: that we are on the cusp of a very great war for which the Mideast crisis is just the detonator.
Nonetheless, it does not have to end this way. Unless attacked, it is unlikely that Iran will enter the conflict directly. Hezbollah can do a good enough job of bloodying the Israelis’ nose without the intervention of their friends in Teheran. And the Russians are certain to hold their fire unless Iran and/or Syria are attacked by the U.S. warplanes based on the fleet.
This is not the Grand Chessboard that Zbigniew Brzezinski had in mind when he published his book on the global power outlook in 1997. Nor did he reckon that the U.S. team of strategists in office would not have progressed beyond Chinese checkers.
