by Pepe Escobar via The Cradle

While we are all familiar with Sun Tzu, the Chinese general, military strategist and philosopher who penned the incomparable Art of War, less known is the Strategikon, the Byzantium equivalent on warfare.

Sixth century Byzantium really needed a manual, threatened as it was from the east, successively by Sassanid Persia, Arabs and Turks, and from the north, by waves of steppe invaders, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, semi-nomadic Turkic Pechenegs and Magyars.

Byzantium could not prevail just by following the classic pattern of Roman Empire raw power – they simply didn’t have the means for it.

So military force needed to be subordinate to diplomacy, a less costly means of avoiding or resolving conflict. And here we can make a fascinating connection with today’s Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin and his diplomacy chief Sergei Lavrov.

But when military means became necessary for Byzantium – as in Russia’s Operation Z – it was preferable to use weaponry to contain or punish adversaries, instead of attacking with full force.

Strategic primacy, for Byzantium, more than diplomatic or military, was a psychological affair. The word Strategia itself is derived from the Greek strategos – which does not mean “General” in military terms, as the west believes, but historically corresponds to a managerial politico-military function.

It all starts with si vis pacem para bellum: “If you want peace prepare for war.” Confrontation must develop simultaneously on multiple levels: grand strategy, military strategy, operative, tactical.

But brilliant tactics, excellent operative intel and even massive victories in a larger war theater cannot compensate for a lethal mistake in terms of grand strategy. Just look at the Nazis in WWII.

Those who built up an empire such as the Romans, or maintained one for centuries like the Byzantines, never succeeded without following this logic.

Those clueless Pentagon and CIA ‘experts’

On Operation Z, the Russians revel in total strategic ambiguity, which has the collective west completely discombobulated. The Pentagon does not have the necessary intellectual firepower to out-smart the Russian General Staff. Only a few outliers understand that this is not a war – since the Ukraine Armed Forces have been irretrievably routed – but actually what Russian military and naval expert Andrei Martyanov calls a “combined arms police operation,” a work-in-progress on demilitarization and denazification.

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is even more abysmal in terms of getting everything wrong, as recently demonstrated by its chief Avril Haines during her questioning on Capitol Hill. History shows that the CIA strategically blew it all the way from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq. Ukraine is no different.

Ukraine was never about a military win. What is being accomplished is the slow, painful destruction of the European Union (EU) economy, coupled with extraordinary weapons profits for the western military-industrial complex and creeping security rule by those nations’ political elites.

The latter, in turn, have been totally baffled by Russia’s C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities, coupled with the stunning inefficiency of their own constellation of Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and Turkish Bayraktar drones.

This ignorance reaches way beyond tactics and the operational and strategic realm. As Martyanov delightfully points out, they “wouldn’t know what hit them on the modern battlefield with near-peer, forget about peer.”

The caliber of ‘strategic’ advice from the NATO realm was self-evident in the Serpent Island fiasco – a direct order issued by British ‘consultants’ to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valery Zaluzhny, thought the whole thing was suicidal. He was proven right.

All the Russians had to do was launch a few choice anti-ship and surface Onyx missiles from bastions stationed in Crimea on airports south of Odessa. In no time, Serpent Island was back under Russian control – even as high-ranking British and American marine officers ‘disappeared’ during the Ukrainian landing on the island. They were the ‘strategic’ NATO actors on the spot, doling out the lousy advice.

Extra evidence that the Ukraine debacle is predominantly about money laundering – not competent military strategy – is Capitol Hill approving a hefty extra $40 billion in ‘aid’ to Kiev. It’s just another western military-industrial complex bonanza, duly noted by Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia Dmitry Medvedev.

Russian forces, meanwhile, have brought diplomacy to the battlefield, handing over 10 tons of humanitarian assistance to the people of liberated Kherson – with the deputy head of the military-civil administration of the region, Kirill Stremousov, announcing that Kherson wants to become part of the Russian Federation.

In parallel, Georgy Muradov, deputy prime minister of the government of Crimea, has “no doubts that the liberated territories of the south of the former Ukraine will become another region of Russia. This, as we assess from our communication with the inhabitants of the region, is the will of the people themselves, most of whom lived for eight years under conditions of repression and bullying by the Ukronazis.”

Denis Pushilin, the head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, is adamant that the DPR is on the verge of liberating “its territories within constitutional borders,” and then a referendum on joining Russia will take place. When it comes to the Luhansk People’s Republic, the integration process may even come earlier: the only area left to be liberated is the urban region of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk.

The ‘Stalingrad of Donbass’

As much as there’s an energetic debate among the best Russian analysts about the pace of Operation Z, Russian military planning proceeds methodically, as if taking all the time it needs to solidify facts on the ground.

Arguably the best example is the fate of Azov neo-Nazis at Azovstal in Mariupol – the best-equipped unit of the Ukrainians, hands down. In the end, they were totally outmatched by a numerically inferior Russian/Chechen Spetsnaz contingent, and in record time for such a big city.

Another example is the advance on Izyum, in the Kharkov region – a key bridgehead in the frontline. The Russian Ministry of Defense follows the pattern of grinding the enemy while slowly advancing; if they face serious resistance, they stop and smash the Ukrainian defensive lines with non-stop missile and artillery strikes.

Popasnaya in Luhansk, dubbed by many Russian analysts as “Mariupol on steroids”, or “the Stalingrad of Donbass,” is now under total control of the Luhansk People’s Republic, after they managed to breach a de facto fortress with linked underground trenches between most civilian houses. Popasnaya is extremely important strategically, as its capture breaks the first, most powerful line of defense of the Ukrainians in Donbass.

That will probably lead to the next stage, with an offensive on Bakhmut along the H-32 highway. The frontline will be aligned, north to south. Bakhmut will be the key to taking control of the M-03 highway, the main route to Slavyansk from the south.

This is just an illustration of the Russian General Staff applying its trademark, methodical, painstaking strategy, where the main imperative could be defined as a personnel-preserving forward drive. With the added benefit of committing just a fraction of overall Russian firepower.

Russian strategy on the battlefield stands in stark contrast with the EU’s obstinacy in being reduced to the status of an American dog’s lunch, with Brussels leading entire national economies to varying degrees of certified collapse and chaos.

Once again it was up to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov – a diplomatic master – to encapsulate it.

Question: “What do you think of Josep Borrell’s (Lavrov’s EU counterpart) initiative to give Ukraine frozen Russian assets as ‘reparations?’ Can we say that the masks have come off and the west is moving on to open robbery?”

Lavrov: “You could say it is theft, which they are not trying to hide … This is becoming a habit for the west … We may soon see the post of the EU chief diplomat abolished because the EU has virtually no foreign policy of its own and acts entirely in solidarity with the approaches imposed by the United States.”

The EU cannot even come up with a strategy to defend its own economic battlefield – just watching as its energy supply is de facto, incrementally turned off by the US. Here we are at the realm where the US tactically excels: economic/financial blackmail. We can’t call these ‘strategic’ moves because they almost always backfire against US hegemonic interests.

Compare it with Russia reaching its biggest surplus in history, with the rise and rise of commodity prices and the upcoming role of the stronger and stronger ruble as a resource-based currency also backed by gold.

Moscow is spending way less than the NATO contingent in the Ukrainian theater. NATO has already wasted $50 billion – and counting – while the Russians spent $4 billion, give or take, and already conquered Mariupol, Berdyansk, Kherson and Melitopol, created a land corridor to Crimea (and secured its water supply), controls the Sea of Azov and its major port city, and liberated strategically vital Volnovakha and Popasnaya in Donbass, as well as Izyum near Kharkov.

That doesn’t even include Russia hurling the entire, collective west into a level of recession not seen since the 1970s.

The Russian strategic victory, as it stands, is military, economic, and may even coalesce geopolitically. Centuries after the Byzantine Strategikon was penned, the Global South would be very much interested in getting acquainted with the 21st century Russian version of the Art of War.

US Admiral Eric Olson, a highly decorated Special Operations commander was captured/surrendered in Azovstal, Mariupol. Was this the nature of the call made by Austin to Shoigu on Friday. Surely, yes.

More to come out of the hiding. Canadian general(s), French general(s), Turkish, etc.?!…. à la guerre comme à la guerre.

US Admiral Eric Olson (Highly decorated special ops commander) born in #Tacoma , Wa USA captured in #Azovstal #Mariupol #BREAKING https://t.co/azlvL5Y007 pic.twitter.com/tyVgHzTsUl

— UkraineNews (@Ukraine66251776) May 15, 2022

Russia’s restrained reaction to Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO reflects not the absence of symmetrical countermeasures, but an inevitability that has already become accustomed to a few years ago. Looking at how these countries annually increased military spending, approaching the target 2% of GDP (the Finns have already reached it), as well as their participation in major joint exercises, exchanges, military programs of the alliance, no insights have happened now.

The special operation in Ukraine was only a trigger for the accelerated entry of these countries into the alliance, but by no means the very reason. NATO representatives worked on these countries for a long time and tried in every possible way to prove outgoing aggression from Russia. After the start of the NMD, they even sent additional forces to the Baltic region to demonstrate the fight against “Russian aggression”. And all this is happening against the backdrop of joint military exercises between Finland and Sweden.

But even as a member of NATO, the Finns and Swedes want to maintain their military neutrality, at least partially. Sweden has already announced that it is not going to place nuclear weapons and military bases on its territory.

As for Russia, it will have to strengthen the grouping of ground forces and air defense on the border, as well as the fleet in the Gulf of Finland. But there will be no cardinal changes in military policy.

🇺🇸🇺🇦 The American company SpaceX has published an updated map with coverage areas of the Starlink global satellite communications system.

32 countries, mostly European, have been added to the new list. In a number of states, including Latin American, African and Southeast Asia, Starlink will appear by the end of 2022 – the beginning of 2023.

Interesting in this list is the inclusion of the countries of the post-Soviet space, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Armenia, in the category of “expecting in 2023”.

What does it threaten?

During a special military operation, Starlink complexes proved their effectiveness in critical conditions:

▪️ Efforts to destroy cell towers and repeaters on the territory of Ukraine have been leveled.

▪️ In the territories where Starlink is used, Russian TV and radio channels are completely banned from broadcasting. The presentation of information is selective.

▪️ Relatively stable and fast data transfer between units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine via secure channels has been ensured.

Currently, active anti-Russian propaganda is going on in the post-Soviet space, sponsored by the UK and the USA and implemented through a number of NGOs.

Connecting the population of Russia’s allied countries to Starlink will allow you to control the flow of information passing to the consumer, blocking everything except “useful” for the West.

In the future, adding the activities of numerous NGOs, this can lead to an even greater split and subsequent distance from interaction with the Russian Federation.

@rybar

by Scott Ritter via RT.com
Excerpt
[…]

Some harsh truths

As the military operation in Ukraine enters its third month, some harsh truths have emerged which are altering how both the Russian armed forces and modern warfare will be assessed going forward. Few analysts — including this author — expected serious resistance to last more than a month. Indeed, General Milley had briefed Congress during closed-door briefings in early February that a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine could result in the fall of Kiev within 72 hours.

There were several reasons for such an assessment. First and foremost was the extensive preparation that had been conducted by Russia in advance of the military incursion. The movement of hundreds of thousands of troops along with their equipment and the logistical means to sustain both men and material in combat is not a trivial exercise, and Russia had been engaged in military drills which stretched out over the course of several months, perfecting such logistics. The Russian military is led by officers who excel in staff work and preparation, and to assume that they had planned for every possibility that could be encountered on the battlefield is not an outlandish proposition.

Doctrinally, the Russian military was configured for the kind of warfare it had prepared for, where its overwhelming advantages in mass and firepower were optimized to produce the very battlefield results anticipated by most observers — the destruction of enemy defenses in depth with massed fire, followed by an aggressive armored assault that penetrated deep into the enemy rear areas, sowing confusion and disruption leading to the rapid loss of combat effectiveness on the part of those being attacked.

A Russian-Ukrainian war was always going to be primarily a ground war; neither the Ukrainian Air Force nor its Navy was expected to put up a sustained, viable resistance to their Russian counterparts. While the Ukrainian Army had been trained and equipped as a virtual NATO proxy force since 2015, the reality was that it had undergone a rapid expansion from 2014, when it could field some 6,000 combat-ready troops, to its pre-military operation composition of some 150,000 soldiers organized into 24 brigades. The expectation that Ukraine would be able to perfect anything more than basic battalion-sized combined arms operations (i.e., the coordinated employment of maneuver forces with artillery and air support) was wishful thinking.

While Ukraine had placed a great deal of effort in transitioning from an all-conscript military in 2014 to one where some 60% of its combat personnel were professional contract soldiers led by seasoned non-commissioned officers, one cannot create such a force in so short of time. Small unit leadership of the sort that represents the glue that holds a military force together under the strain and duress of sustained combat simply had not had enough time to take hold and mature in the Ukrainian army, leading many to assess that it would fold when placed under the stress of Russian doctrinal warfare.

The following analysis is sourced from publicly-available reporting by journalists embedded with the Russian military and the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic, as well as Russian Ministry of Defense briefings and statements made by the Ukrainian side.

Within the first week of the Russian operation getting underway, it was clear to most that many of the assumptions that had been made were flawed and/or misplaced. First and foremost, Moscow had opted not to employ its forces according to standard doctrine, opting instead to take a light approach, which appeared to be born from a concerted effort to minimize civilian casualties and harm to civilian infrastructure that itself was derived from a fundamental misunderstanding of the reality of the situation on the ground in Ukraine.

The reported purging of 150 officers from the 5th Department of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), responsible for operations in the so-called ‘near abroad‘ (which includes Ukraine), along with the arrest of Sergei Beseda, the former head of the department, suggests that Russia had suffered a failure of intelligence the likes of which has not been seen since the Israeli failure to predict the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973.

While the Russian government has remained characteristically tight-lipped about any possible shortcomings regarding the work of the 5th Department prior to the start of the military operation, the statements by Russian leadership suggesting that the Ukrainian military might remain in its barracks and that civilian leadership would not interfere with Russia military operations suggest that these assumptions were made using intelligence provided by the 5th Department. That such assumptions, if indeed they were made, proved to be so fundamentally off target, when combined with the preparedness of the Ukrainian military to engage the initial columns of Russian forces, suggests that the work of the 5th Department had been disrupted by Ukrainian security services, who took control of Russian human networks and fed false reports back to the Russian leadership.

The fact is that columns of Russian troops, advancing boldly into Ukraine without the kind of attention to route security and flank protection that would normally accompany offensive operations, found themselves cut off and annihilated by well-prepared Ukrainian ambushes. Moreover, instead of folding under pressure, the Ukrainian Army — both regular and those from the territorial forces — stood their ground and fought, using hand-held anti-tank weapons— US-made Javelins and British-made NLAWs— to great effect. It was, to use an American colloquialism, a Turkey shoot, and the Ukrainian government made effective use of combat footage obtained from such encounters to great effect in shaping global public opinion about the effectiveness of Ukraine’s defenses.

However, the limitations of the Ukrainian armed forces did not allow it to turn its impressive tactical victories into positive operational and strategic outcomes. Despite costly initial setbacks, the Russian Army pressed home its attack, achieving impressive gains in the south, where Russian forces operating out of Crimea secured the strategic city of Kherson and advanced on the equally important city of Mariupol. There, they joined with Russian and allied forces from the Donetsk Republic to surround the Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol, eventually trapping the survivors, numbering several thousand strong, in the reinforced concrete underworld of the Azovstal steel factory. Further north, Russian forces, together with the forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, advanced westward to drive Ukrainian forces from their prepared defenses to gain control of the totality of the territory encompassing the Donbass region.

[…]

via Moon of Alabama

Did Germany really decide to deliver tanks to the Ukraine?

The German government said Tuesday it will deliver anti-aircraft tanks to Ukraine after facing strong pressure at home and abroad to abandon its reluctance to supply heavy weapons to Kyiv.The decision to provide the “Gepard” tanks, which come from German defense industry stocks, was made at a closed-door government meeting on Monday, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht told reporters at a Ukraine security conference at a U.S. airbase in Ramstein, Germany. There was no immediate information on how many tanks Germany would deliver.

The announcement marks a notable shift for Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who as recently as last week was still ruling out sending German tanks to Ukraine, insisting it would make more sense for Eastern NATO countries to give Kyiv old Soviet-era tanks already familiar to the Ukrainian military. Scholz promised Germany would then send those countries replacement German tanks.

I find it amusing how many misunderstand this move. First off – the Gepard (Cheetah) is not a tank as the turret has very little protective armor.

bigger

It is a short range (5 km / 3 miles) anti-air system on a tank chassis useful against helicopters, drones and low flying planes.

That Scholz decided to offer these, instead of real tanks or armored infantry carriers as the U.S. and the camouflage-Green party demanded, is a nice way out. It guarantees that the Ukrainians will not be able to use them before the war is over.

The Gepard system with its two 35mm cannons is more than 50 years old but has been upgraded two or three times. The Germany army retired their last one of these in 2010. They have since been held in storage.

I remember them well from my time in the Bundeswehr. While my primary training was as a gunner on a real tank, the Leopard 1A3, two people I knew were trained as gunners for the Gepard. There was a huge difference though. It took 6 months of training to become a reasonably good tank gunner. It took 12 month, including hundreds of hours in a simulator, to become a gunner on a Gepard. The commander role required even more training.

The system was excellent for its time but also really complicate. The two radars have various modes for different purposes. One would better use the right one or risk to attract explosive countermeasures. The startup of the turret systems and the handling of their various error modes that could occur were not easy to handle. The tank chassis is also more complicate than the original one. It has an additional motor which powers five electric generators, two Metadyne rotary transformers and a flywheel to handle the extraordinary fast movements of the turret (2.5 sec for a 360°turn).

There are probably less than ten people in the current Bundeswehr who still know how to operate and maintain a Gepard. There is thus little chance to find German crews for them.

If the Ukrainians really want to use these outdated systems they will have to train fresh crews for at least a year. Otherwise those guns will be ineffective and of little use.

My hunch though is that none of these will ever be delivered. The Swiss, who manufactured the cannons and their ammunition, have seen to that:

Neutral Switzerland has vetoed the re-export of Swiss-made ammunition used in Gepard anti-aircraft tanks that Germany is sending to Ukraine, the government said on Tuesday.Germany earlier announced its first delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine to help it fend off Russian attacks following weeks of pressure at home and abroad to do so.

The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) confirmed a report by broadcaster SRF that it had blocked Germany from sending munitions for the Gepard tank to Ukraine.

Chancellor Scholz likely knew all that. The offer of Gepards is a safe way to relieve the pressure put onto him to send arms to Ukraine. It is an offer of a system that can not be used within the timeframe of the war and for which he can not deliver the necessary specialized ammunition.

Are there still some Lockheed F-104 Starfighter in German storage? If so those flying coffins should be offered next.

By Daniel Kovalik via RT

Daniel Kovalik teaches International Human Rights at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and is author of the recently-releasedNo More War: How the West Violates International Law by Using “Humanitarian” Intervention to Advance Economic and Strategic Interests.

The argument can be made that Russia exercised its right for self-defense

For many years, I have studied and given much thought to the UN Charter’s prohibition against aggressive war. No one can seriously doubt that the primary purpose of the document – drafted and agreed to on the heels of the horrors of WWII – was and is to prevent war and “to maintain international peace and security,” a phrase repeated throughout.

As the Justices at Nuremberg correctly concluded, “To initiate a war of aggression … is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” That is, war is the paramount crime because all of the evils we so abhor – genocide, crimes against humanity, etc. – are the terrible fruits of the tree of war.

In light of the above, I have spent my entire adult life opposing war and foreign intervention. Of course, as an American, I have had ample occasion to do so given that the US is, as Martin Luther King stated, “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world.” Similarly, Jimmy Carter recently stated that the US is “the most war-like nation in the history of the world.” This is demonstrably true, of course. In my lifetime alone, the US has waged aggressive and unprovoked wars against countries such as Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq (twice), Afghanistan, Libya, and Somalia. And this doesn’t even count the numerous proxy wars the US has fought via surrogates (e.g., through the Contras in Nicaragua, various jihadist groups in Syria, and through Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the ongoing war against Yemen).

Indeed, through such wars, the US has done more, and intentionally so, than any nation on earth to undermine the legal pillars prohibiting war. It is in reaction to this, and with the express desire to try to salvage what is left of the UN Charter’s legal prohibitions against aggressive war, that a number of nations, including Russia and China, founded the Group of Friends in Defense of the UN Charter.

In short, for the US to complain about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a violation of international law is, at best, the pot calling the kettle black. Still, the fact that the US is so obviously hypocritical in this regard does not necessarily mean Washington is automatically wrong. In the end, we must analyze Russia’s conduct on its own merits.

One must begin this discussion by accepting the fact that there was already a war happening in Ukraine for the eight years preceding the Russian military incursion in February 2022. And, this war by the government in Kiev against the Russian-speaking peoples of the Donbass – a war which claimed the lives of around 14,000 people, many of them children, and displaced around 1.5 million more even before Russia’s military operation – has been arguably genocidal. That is, the government in Kiev, and especially its neo-Nazi battalions, carried out attacks against these peoples with the intention of destroying, at least in part, the ethnic Russians precisely because of their ethnicity.

While the US government and media are trying hard to obscure these facts, they are undeniable, and were indeed reported by the mainstream Western press before it became inconvenient to do so. Thus, a commentary run by Reuters in 2018 clearly sets out how the neo-Nazis battalions have been integrated into the official Ukrainian military and police forces, and are thus state, or at least quasi-state, actors for which the Ukrainian government bears legal responsibility. As the piece relates, there are 30-some right-wing extremist groups operating in Ukraine, that “have been formally integrated into Ukraine’s armed forces,” and that “the more extreme among these groups promote an intolerant and illiberal ideology… ”

That is, they possess and promote hatred towards ethnic Russians, the Roma peoples, and members of the LGBT community as well, and they act out this hatred by attacking, killing, and displacing these peoples. The piece cites the Western human rights group Freedom House for the proposition that “an increase in patriotic discourse supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia has coincided with an apparent increase in both public hate speech, sometimes by public officials and magnified by the media, as well as violence towards vulnerable groups such as the LGBT community.” And this has been accompanied by actual violence. For example, “Azov and other militias have attacked anti-fascist demonstrations, city council meetings, media outlets, art exhibitions, foreign students and Roma.”

As reported in Newsweek, Amnesty International had been reporting on these very same extremist hate groups and their accompanying violent activities as far back as 2014.

It is this very type of evidence – public hate speech combined with large-scale, systemic attacks on the targets of the speech – that has been used to convict individuals of genocide, for example in the Rwandan genocide case against Jean-Paul Akayesu.

To add to this, there are well over 500,000 residents of the Donbass region of Ukraine who are also Russian citizens. While that estimate was made in April 2021, after Vladimir Putin’s 2019 decree simplified the process of obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, this means that Russian citizens were being subjected to racialized attack by neo-Nazi groups integrated into the government of Ukraine, and right on the border of Russia.

And lest Russia was uncertain about the Ukrainian government’s intentions regarding the Russian ethnics in the Donbass, the government in Kiev passed new language laws in 2019 which made it clear that Russian speakers were at best second-class citizens. Indeed, the usually pro-West Human Rights Watch (HRW) expressed alarm about these laws. As the HRW explained in an early-2022 report which received nearly no coverage in the Western media, the government in Kiev passed legislation which “requires print media outlets registered in Ukraine to publish in Ukrainian. Publications in other languages must also be accompanied by a Ukrainian version, equivalent in content, volume, and method of printing. Additionally, places of distribution such as newsstands must have at least half their content in Ukrainian.”

And, according to the HRW, “Article 25, regarding print media outlets, makes exceptions for certain minority languages, English, and official EU languages, but not for Russian”(emphasis added), the justification for that being “the century of oppression of … Ukrainian in favor of Russian.” As the HRW explained, “[t]here are concerns about whether guarantees for minority languages are sufficient. The Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s top advisory body on constitutional matters, said that several of the law’s articles, including article 25, ‘failed to strike a fair balance’ between promoting the Ukrainian language and safeguarding minorities’ linguistic rights.” Such legislation only underscored the Ukrainian government’s desire to destroy the culture, if not the very existence, of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

Moreover, as the Organization of World Peace reported in 2021, “according to Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Decree no. 117/2021, Ukraine has committed to putting all options on the table to taking back control over the Russian annexed Crimea region. Signed on March 24th, President Zelensky has committed the country to pursue strategies that . . . ‘will prepare and implement measures to ensure the de-occupation and reintegration of the peninsula.’” Given that the residents of Crimea, most of whom are ethnic Russians, are quite happy with the current state of affairs under Russian governance – this, according to a 2020 Washington Post report – Zelensky’s threat in this regard was not only a threat against Russia itself but was also a threat of potentially massive bloodshed against a people who do not want to go back to Ukraine.

Without more, this situation represents a much more compelling case for justifying Russian intervention under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine which has been advocated by such Western ‘humanitarians’ as Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, and Susan Rice, and which was relied upon to justify the NATO interventions in countries like the former Yugoslavia and Libya. And moreover, none of the states involved in these interventions could possibly make any claims of self-defense. This is especially the case for the United States, which has been sending forces thousands of miles away to drop bombs on far-flung lands.

Indeed, this recalls to mind the words of the great Palestinian intellectual, Edward Said, who opined years ago in his influential work, ‘Culture and Imperialism’, that it is simply unfair to try to compare the empire-building of Russia with that of the West. As Dr. Said explained, “Russia … acquired its imperial territories almost exclusively by adjacence. Unlike Britain and France, which jumped thousands of miles beyond their own borders to other continents, Russia moved to swallow whatever land or peoples stood next to its borders … but in the English and French cases, the sheer distance of attractive territories summoned the projection of far-flung interest …” This observation is doubly applicable to the United States.

Still, there is more to consider regarding Russia’s claimed justifications for intervention. Thus, not only are there radical groups on its border attacking ethnic Russians, including Russian citizens, but also, these groups have reportedly been funded and trained by the United States with the very intention of destabilizing and undermining the territorial integrity of Russia itself.

As Yahoo News! explained in a January 2022 article:

“The CIA is overseeing a secret intensive training program in the U.S. for elite Ukrainian special operations forces and other intelligence personnel, according to five former intelligence and national security officials familiar with the initiative. The program, which started in 2015, is based at an undisclosed facility in the Southern U.S., according to some of those officials.

The program has involved ‘very specific training on skills that would enhance’ the Ukrainians’ ‘ability to push back against the Russians,’ said the former senior intelligence official.

The training, which has included ‘tactical stuff,’ is ‘going to start looking pretty offensive if Russians invade Ukraine,’ said the former official.

One person familiar with the program put it more bluntly. ‘The United States is training an insurgency,’ said a former CIA official, adding that the program has taught the Ukrainians how ‘to kill Russians.’” (emphasis added).

To remove any doubt that the destabilization of Russia itself has been the goal of the US in these efforts, one should examine the very telling 2019 report of the Rand Corporation – a long-time defense contractor called upon to advise the US on how to carry out its policy goals. In this report, entitled, ‘Overextending and Unbalancing Russia, Assessing the Impact of Cost-Imposing Options’, one of the many tactics listed is “Providing lethal aid to Ukraine” in order to “exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability.”

In short, there is no doubt that Russia has been threatened, and in a quite profound way, with concrete destabilizing efforts by the US, NATO and their extremist surrogates in Ukraine. Russia has been so threatened for a full eight years. And Russia has witnessed what such destabilizing efforts have meant for other countries, from Iraq to Afghanistan to Syria to Libya – that is, nearly a total annihilation of the country as a functioning nation-state.

It is hard to conceive of a more pressing case for the need to act in defense of the nation. While the UN Charter prohibits unilateral acts of war, it also provides, in Article 51, that“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense… ” And this right of self-defense has been interpreted to permit countries to respond, not only to actual armed attacks, but also to the threat of imminent attack.

In light of the above, it is my assessment that this right has been triggered in the instant case, and that Russia had a right to act in its own self-defense by intervening in Ukraine, which had become a proxy of the US and NATO for an assault – not only on Russian ethnics within Ukraine – but also upon Russia itself. A contrary conclusion would simply ignore the dire realities facing Russia.

Comment:

What I see are men who are defeated and know it. Next, they realize from first moment of contact these Russians are treating them with respect and with fellowship. It is unmistakable even when you don’t know the language. My God, wounded promptly get care where the Uke army would shoot them.

Speaking as an ex-prison inmate I see lots of stuff. The prisoners are eating with metal utensils and no one is counting or tracking that in any way. If they wanted to make shivs there it is, the Russians know these guys are not making any shivs. They are all wearing heavy coats with infinite possibility for concealing contraband. Again the Russians are not worried about contraband. The prisoners walk around with their hands in those coats. Sometimes allowed minutes after surrender. The prisoners and the jailers are brothers and they know it. Ukes figure that one out immediately.

Prisoners are telling stories about surrendering because all their officers vanished. And they do not know what to do without command. Finding another Uke unit to join could be plain dangerous. Otherwise to surrender they have to kill the political officers in their platoon, company, battalion. I do not know if that is happening, if it is the Russians would sure know which side the prisoners are on.

Some number of prisoners have been interviewed, fed, asked to sign a paper saying they won’t fight again. They are handed traveling food and sent home. Even given that opportunity some want to stick around, going home could be dangerous in wartime. So there is video of work crews barely supervised handling tools that would make fine weapons, disposing of ordnance that would make fine bombs.

The surrendered are going to go home and tell the family and neighbors what great guys the Russians are. That the Russians treated them better than Kiev ever did.

via RT

The country’s defense industry did extensive modernization for years, says the Russian Vice Prime Minister in charge of the process.

Contrary to Western expectations, Russia hasn’t run out of precision munitions during the now almost two-month-long conflict in Ukraine. RT spoke to Yury Borisov, Russian vice prime minister in charge of defense procurement, about the state of the nation’s defense industry and the impact of Western sanctions on it.

RT: Mr. Borisov, the West has imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, measures that the Kremlin has dubbed an overt economic war. Can you tell us how state defense procurements are functioning under this pressure?

Yury Borisov: We don’t see any serious threats that could undermine our work on the planned tasks in state defense procurement. Perhaps this is a result of our Western partners keeping us on our toes since 2014. We have had plenty of time to adapt to the continuous sanctions they have been introducing against Russia. We now have import substitution policies in place, and we have accumulated a necessary reserve stock of critically important materials and components. Therefore, Russia’s current state defense procurement program is under no threat.

I would say that today’s situation in defense procurement is even better compared to the previous years. We already have contracts for 88% of our annual commitments. In previous years, we would not normally get to this figure before the end of May. And the cash execution of the state budget looks really good.

This has to do primarily with the fact that given the current situation around the sanctions against Russia’s financial institutions, which necessitated an increase in the key rate, we are trying to use the budgetary resources appropriated for the defense procurement program as much as we can.

The customers of state defense procurement and acquisition – mainly Russia’s defense Ministry, but also other government agencies – actively employ the 100% prepaid model for procurement of basic electronic components, basic materials and component parts. This provides hedging of risks related to nonperformance and helps build up a reserve stock. We are absolutely certain that by the end of this year, the mean annual share of completed contracts will reach 97-98%. This has become our standard already. However, all outstanding obligations to the key customers are usually cleared in the first quarter of the following year.

RT: Import substitution must now be among the top priorities, and more urgent than ever before, especially when it comes to the defense industry. Just an example, from my own experience, I was recently near Kiev, and the military vehicles that were taking us, the reporters, on assignments were Typhoons. They are impressive vehicles, but…

Yury Borisov: There are several variants. Which one were you using, was it a four-by-four armored vehicle?

RT: No, it was a six-by-six.

Yury Borisov: So it was a KAMAZ Typhoon vehicle, I see. (KamAZ-63968 Typhoon-K – RT).

RT: Yes, absolutely, it was a KAMAZ Typhoon vehicle, right. But, for instance, it has Michelin tires. The transmission gearbox is imported too, and lots of other parts, so that the mechanics say they don’t even know how it’s going to be now regarding spare parts. And, as far as I know, Typhoons are not the only example of a really great Russian vehicle that people are now having questions about in terms of maintenance. Do you have an answer to these questions?

Yury Borisov: Of course, I do. We had a number of meetings with major manufacturers regarding both Russia’s state defense procurement program and the automotive industry on the whole.

It surely is a very challenging situation for our automotive industry now that some key components are no longer available.

If we consider the entire range of the vehicles we produce, from trucks to buses, including passenger buses, we will see that the extent of locally manufactured content is very different. The share of foreign-made components can be very different. This industry is undergoing a considerable change today, just like Russia’s entire economy and all other industries. Changes are being introduced into the supply chains; we’re bringing in new suppliers. Of course, it means that production will slow down, obviously. We are open about this.

But transitioning to new suppliers and opening new supply channels to ensure we get the necessary parts will ensure a more sustainable production in the future.

In some cases, it will mean that manufacturers will have to downgrade a little, to use less sophisticated components, for example, to go back to a manual gearbox rather than an automatic one. In some cases, the scope of provided features will have to be reduced, but none of that will seriously affect the operational qualities and consumer experience.

KAMAZ, for one, is about to fully localize production of its K-5 flagship model. This truck will soon drive Volvo and Mercedes from the market, making KAMAZ number one on the market for transport trucks.

As for military equipment and vehicles, I recall that in May 2014, back when I served as deputy defense minister, we launched a ministry initiative, proposed at meetings in Sochi, to phase out all imports of Ukrainian- and NATO-produced components.

Back then, we made two lists of all imported components that were critical to Russia’s state defense procurement program. And we kept working, step-by-step, to phase out all such imports from Ukraine. Back in the day, there were Ukrainian components we couldn’t do without, for example, marine engines and turbines manufactured by Zorya-Mashproyekt and Ivchenko Progress. The same was true for Motor Sich-produced aircraft engines and some other components for the aviation industry. That was because Russia’s military air transportation fleet at the time consisted mostly of Soviet models, as it still does, and many were co-developed by the Ukraine-based Antonov design bureau.

By the end of 2018, we successfully phased out most of the Ukrainian imports in military technology.

I believe Russia only benefited from this. It means that we have secured all our future operations and are no longer relying on supplies from Ukraine. Ukraine, on the other hand, has lost a large market. Those several billion dollars the country could have made in recent years could have boosted the Ukrainian economy.

But what’s done is done. We’re on the same track to phase out imports from so-called ‘unfriendly countries, ‘the member states of NATO. The progress here is, however, slow, as the task is more challenging. They supply mostly electronic components, where cutting edge technologies are applied, both for civil and military purposes.

One example that has made the headlines is the Irkut MC-21 airliner. We started off by switching to the locally produced composite materials, and that’s done now. More recently, pressured by the new round of sanctions introduced in response to the operation in Ukraine, we have almost completely phased out all imports of parts such as Pratt & Whitney engines for our flagship projects. We’re really stepping up our transition efforts.

RT: Speaking of this, I have a question for you about the PD-14 engine and the SSJ-100 jet.

Yury Borisov: The PD-14 turbofan engine is already used in the Russian MC-21 airliner. Today, when foreign engine producers have cut off their supplies, this option is no longer on the table for us. You see, in the past there used to be two options – our jets either used foreign-made engines or PD-14s. So now we will have to start mass production of jets equipped with the Russian-made PD-14 engine. And we will have to find substitutes for a number of critically important avionic onboard systems. In late 2024, early 2025, we will have to move on to ramping up mass production of MC-21, which is a fully Russian-made airliner, made up of exclusively domestic components.

Russia plans to make the Superjet-100 aircraft fully independent of imported components by 2023, and starting from 2024, to launch mass production of at least 20 jets per year. This will meet the expected domestic market demand for this model in the foreseeable future. It will be a fully Russian-made aircraft, the Superjet-100-New. And in late 2024, early 2025, we will have to move on to ramping up mass production of the MC-21, which is a fully Russian-made airliner, made up of exclusively domestic components.

I am sure we will learn from this situation, draw the right conclusions that will serve us in the future. We are not on the moon, so we can’t stay clear of the global division of labor, so to speak. And we don’t mean to do this, either. Fortunately for us, the world is not limited to the US and Europe, which keep slapping us with unprecedented sanctions. Most countries, in fact, did not support these sanctions and are prepared to work with Russia. The largest BRICS economies are among them, China, India, Brazil, and a number of Arab countries continue to work with us, too. Russia is on the lookout for new suppliers right now. I believe that the Russian economy will manage to withstand the effect of these sanctions and the pressure, which is very hard for us, of course. However, this situation has its advantages that we have seen put into practice already. In particular, if it were not for the sanctions introduced back in 2014, Russia’s agriculture sector would not be where it is now. And as it is, we are able to cover the domestic need for all basic agriculture products on our own. And not only that, Russia’s cereal imports have increased in recent years. We don’t only provide for ourselves, we are practically feeding the world today.

The main bonus that comes with import substitution is that new niches are created in the economy. It’s a challenge and an opportunity for Russian industry, for Russian design and engineering, for research and development centers to use their own modern technology and products in order to fill these niches and not give them up. I can say that such niches have opened in almost every systemically important sector of Russia’s economy.

It’s a serious challenge. But, on the other hand, it’s an excellent opportunity for companies to massively increase their presence on the domestic market and lay solid groundwork for entering global markers in the future.

RT: Speaking about aircraft engineering, what is the current status of the IL-496 project?

Yury Borisov: The IL-496 aircraft, or IL-96-400, is due to be completed this year. So far, as you know, we’ve had the IL-96-300 produced in a small series and used for a number of purposes, mostly for the special flight squadron, which carries the president and the prime minister, and conducts special military flights.

A limited serial production could be launched if needed, two to four aircraft per year, to ensure long-range flights. This hasn’t been necessary so far. But I think this model is a very good one, praised by all the pilots. It has had virtually no accidents throughout its lifetime. So, there will be demand.

RT: Let’s talk more about Russia’s military capabilities. US intelligence was quick to report that Russia was out of its entire stock of Kalibr missiles within the first week or so of the special operation. And yet, they are still operational, successfully delivering precision strikes on enemy targets. I fully understand that most of the information regarding our weapons is top secret, however. What I would like to ask is whether our defense industry is up to the task of re-supplying all the weapons our troops have used up already, like the Kalibr, Iskander and Kinzhal missiles. How is it doing in this regard?

Yury Borisov: First of all, these missiles that you mentioned, as well as some others including Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, and Bastion and Bal coastal defense missile systems, as well as the above mentioned sea-launched cruise missiles, the Kalibr, Iskander and Kinzhal, all fall into the category of high-precision weapons. Modern warfare favors the use of high-precision weapons, starting from the Yugoslav wars in the late 20th century.

High-precision weapons are to a certain extent more humane, if that can be said about any weapon at all; and that’s because they can be used to eliminate military targets, such as parked vehicles, arms depots, command posts, infrastructure targets, and so on. High precision munitions have the error probability of just a few meters. They can travel hundreds of kilometers and have next to zero CEP.

As a result, they are much more efficient than the weapons of the past that are becoming obsolete. They cause too much destruction and too many civilian deaths, which is unacceptable in such conflicts.

During this operation, Russian troops are making sure to avoid civilian casualties. That’s their priority. Our fight is not with the civilian population. Our fight is to ensure a future for the Russian-speaking civilian population.

I would like to say that high-precision weapons, used by the Russian forces, ensure that we achieve our military goals with the desired level of efficiency.

Now, back to your question. From as early as 2011, all our defense procurement programs have focused on the production and deployment of high-precision weapons. All this time, we have also been building up our manufacturing capacities. As a result, today, we can fully meet the demand of Russia’s armed forces for precision weapons.

Since you mentioned the seaborne Kalibr cruise missile, the fact is that almost all Russian ships and Project 636.6 diesel submarines carry Kalibr missiles. Deployed in the Black Sea, they can strike military targets anywhere in Ukraine. The same is true for other types of missiles, including the Kh-101 airborne missile carried by the Sukhoi Su-30 and Su-35 fighter-bombers. We have a wide range of air-to-surface munitions with a different effective range and power to hit different types of targets. Because of that, Russia dominates the sky in Ukraine. Russia’s Air Force ensures this with its efficient air-launched weapons.

Russia’s major defense manufacturers have contracts for high-precision weapon production until 2030 or, in some cases, 2033. Those enterprises are doing well. They can plan for the long term and adjust their capacities accordingly. They also keep developing upgrades for these weapon systems. It’s a well-built, sustainable operation, with great future potential. That’s what’s going on in Russia in terms of modern weapons production.

RT: How would you assess the performance of these new, state of the art, high-precision weapons on the battlefield? Not in military exercises, but in actual conflict.

Yury Borisov: As you know, we’ve acquired a lot of experience during the Syrian conflict, where we’ve already put our key weapons to the test.

RT: In the Syrian Arab Republic…

Yury Borisov: Yes. We piloted the key weapons systems in that conflict. And I don’t mind saying that we made corrections as we went on, adjusting the specifications based on our experience. It is the result of cooperation between our military and the defense industry.

Representatives of the military-industrial complex were present on the ground in Syria, supporting all the combat operations, collecting statistics on the performance of various kinds of weapons against their specifications. So this close cooperation yielded very good results, which has already been apparent during the special military operation in Ukraine.

RT: Tell us about the current state of commercial and military shipbuilding in Russia, please. What measures have the government put in place to mitigate the effect of sanctions and support commercial and military shipbuilding?

Yury Borisov: As for military shipbuilding, Russia has very solid positions as far as its strategic nuclear-powered submarine fleet is concerned. I mean strategic Borei and Borei-A class submarines and also Yasen class multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines. We have enough of those. Our needs are fully met in this respect, both in terms of quantity and quality. The composition of our strategic nuclear forces is very advanced, state of the art.

In the past, there was a pronounced lack of open ocean vessels in Russia, which mainly focused on small corvette class warships and guided missile ships. As a result, these types of vessels are very modern and upgraded. Over the past three to four years, we have employed a system of loans to finance open ocean vessels, primarily frigates and corvettes.

As for aircraft carriers, such questions are often discussed at defense meetings in Sochi. In general, the development of high-precision and hypersonic weapons sometimes renders aircraft carrier groups useless, overshadowing their potential.

And besides, the US may need a powerful aircraft carrier group, since they are far away and need to cross the ocean before they reach any theater of operation on this continent. Russia, on the contrary, has always pursued a defense strategy, so the need for these types of vessels is debatable. But I think that you can’t just stop using this type of naval equipment altogether, you must think about it all the time. But this costs a lot of money.

At the same time, it’s possible to achieve the goals set for the Russian Navy in a more economical way – by opting for cheaper models, if we are talking of open ocean vessels, for example, and achieve a similar effect. So, it’s up to the military to determine what they really need. Even when I worked at the defense ministry, I never deemed it possible for myself to teach military professionals which types of weapons are best for them. They will decide on their own.

RT: Besides, an aircraft carrier is an easy target…

Yury Borisov: It’s a target, yes. But, of course, it’s protected. It is equipped with anti-aircraft and missile defense systems. Now, let’s talk about commercial ships.

Since Soviet times, all our ships had been manufactured in countries like Finland, or in former COMECON countries, such as Poland. Only recently have we started developing our own key shipbuilding assets, such as the United Shipbuilding Corporation.

In the Far East, we have the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex, which specializes in large-capacity vessels, because those are used for the Northern Sea Route and because that region is a source of hydrocarbons.

Hydrocarbons are mostly transported by sea, using various kinds of ships, such as Aframax vessels, bulk carriers, coal carriers and tankers for liquid hydrocarbons.

This is evidently a new territory for Russian shipbuilders. And, of course, we have established and are developing partnerships with leading shipbuilding countries, starting with South Korea, which is a well-recognized leader in the construction of large-capacity ships. China, which is also a potential partner of ours, is now approaching their level of expertise.

So, we’ll continue manufacturing all these types of ships in the Far East, at the Zvezda shipyard. But we admit that we’ll have to restructure the whole supply chain here as well and look for new partners because two major ship engine makers, MAN and Wartsila, have refused to work with us. We’ll have to find other solutions, including by leveraging our own resources. Sinara and Transmashholding have made some advances in diesel shipbuilding. So we will develop our own expertise, maybe work together with a new R&D alliance.

We will also need fishing and crabbing vessels. It’s a matter of food security. All the recent policies, such as handing out fishing quotas to companies that invest in fleets, have been helpful and spurred demand for such vessels.